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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the role of public participation in planning. 
The initial approach involves a case-study of the planning 
pertaining to the provision for bulk liquified petroleum gas supply 
through the port of Lyttelton. The focus in the case-study is on 
portraying and investigating how the people of the impacted comnunity 
might be considered to have participated. Public participation is 
identified as having a value-laden 'essence'. The poor basis for 
the elucidation of an appropriate role that exists in the literature 
and practice concerning public participation in planning is discussed. 
A framework based on the range of social order theories is adopted 
that accommodates principal variations in meaning. The case-study 
events are identified in terms of the framework. The nature of 
society and the task of planning are considered and conclusions 
derived, revolving on the inappropriateness of the assumption of 
value-consensus and models and perspectives based on this. The 
political nature of planning is affirmed and explicated. The meaning 
of accepting perspectives founded on value-conflict is explored 
primarily in relation to considering the case-study situation. 
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I, THE CASE-STUDY~ PLANNING FOR LIQUIFIED PETROLEUM 
GAS THROUGH LYTTELTON PORT 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
1 
The goal of this study is to investigate the role of public 
participation in planning. A 'gut feeling' motivates the study~ This 
feeling primarily involves the consideration that planning needs public 
participation for essentially moral reasons - perhaps ultimately because 
planning, as a form of social intervention, cannot be justified (as 
opposed to 'legitimized ' ) satisfactorily without it. A second considera-
tion is essentially a pragmatic one, or so it appears; that public 
participation has important utilitarian value for planning. 
Confusingly, but unavoidably, the study has three central 
subjects that are problematic. This is confusing not only in itself but 
also because what is problematic in each instance is not independent 
between subjects. 
The first problematic subject is represented by the goal -
What is the role of public participation in planning? 
The ~econd problematic subject - what is the nature and role 
of planning? - is problematic in itself given the lack of consensus and 
continuing debate on the subject. (Recent British discussion is contained 
in 'Planning and the Future ' , a discussion paper prepared by a working 
group established by the Royal Town Planning Institute (1976) and ensuing 
articles (see, for example, symposium on above paper in Town Planning 
Review, vol 48: 233-46; commentary on symposium by Chairman of working 
group, Law, op cit: 365-72). From America, Hudson's (1979) recent 
discussion and commen'ts of the theoretical bases of planning reveal the 
diversity, and incompatibility, of various planning traditions.) 
2 
The subject is however rendered centrally problematic in this 
study in the. face of consideration of public participation. Conceptions 
of public participation in relation to planning frequently question the 
nature and role of planning; often major redefinition and transformation 
is suggested. 
The third major problematic subject is public participation. It 
is a highly confused concept. The confusion starts with its definition, 
which introduces the seemingly endless paradoxes and contradictions which 
bedevil the literature (see Spiegel and Mittenthal, 1968:3-4; Kasperson, 
1974). 'Consider: is civil disobedience participation? Kasperson (1974: 
3) contemplates "Perhaps the word is best treated like the kaleidoscope -
twist it gingerly this way, turn it about slowly, and examine the config-
urations and designs which emerge ... 11. The virtual absence of both 
empirical and normative theory signals its complexity and its defiance of 
generalisation. So, the nature rir 'essence' of 'public participation l 
is also centrally problematic. 
The approach by which this study pursues its goal is through 
the Imedium l of a case-study. The intention is that the particular 
contextual circumstances involved will serve to elucidate and illustrate 
issues relating to the goal, as well as to provide an empirical base from 
<. 
which to 'test l ideas. 
The case-study delimits inquiry to some extent at least in 
Chapter 1. The Ipublic l that is of principal concern is that of the 
impacted community. The case-study involves, and thus this report 
emphasises, development planning; attention and consideration in the 
case-study focusses on the particular planning and approval organisation 
and procedures that were involved. Issues that are emphasized by the 
case-study in this report derive not only from these arrangements, but 
also from such as the nature of the development: for example, this 
brings the issue oflsafetyl into some prominence as it was a focal issue 
of concern to the community. 
It is not intended however that the case-study subsume the 
goal or delimit the study unnecessarily - at the end of the day, it is 
desired to draw conclusions of applicability to planning in general. 
1.2 THE CASE-STUDY: REVIEW OF SITUATION AND EVENTS 
1.2.1 Introduction 
3 
The case-study concerns planning pertaining to the introduction 
of Liquified Petroleum Gas (L.P.G.) through the port of LytteTton. 
The immediate development proponent is Liquigas Ltd, the bulk 
New Zealand distribution company. It has monopoly contractual access to 
L.P.G. available i~ New Zealand. Since its inception in June, 1981, it 
has been active in developing plans, initiated earlier by various oil 
. . 
companies who became p'artnersin Liquigas, for nationwide L.P.G. supply, 
in conjunction with government prescriptions. 
One part of these plans consists of the provision of supply 
to the Canterbury-Westland region through a sea-fed facility utilising 
the port of Lytte1ton. Consequent to requirements for such provision, 
the plans as evolved involve a bulk storage facility being located at 
Woolston, a pipeline being constructed for its supply from Lytte1ton and 
., 
the use of the oil-wharf located in the inner harbour at Lytte1ton, as 
the terminal site. 
1.2.2 Sequence of Events 
In this section a sequence of events is presented pertinent to 
the evolution of the plans and planning arrangements. The aim is primarily 
familiarisation with the events. 
Late 1970 ' s: Evolution of government economic policy in relation to 
energy strategy inclusive of "goa1s": (i) lito reduce New Zea1and ' s 
dependence on imported oil II and (ii) lito increase diversity in 
New Zea1and ' s energy supply system" (Ministry of Energy, 1980:6). 
,E • , • ~._,~ ~ •• _ 
:~~~{~j~;:~~;; 
-1979: Crysta 11 i sa tion of government "pol icy" (goals) as regards 
production, distribution and pricing of L.P.G .. Revealed as 
transmitted to the Commerce Commission in terms of s 2A(I} 
of the Commerce Act (1975). Included: 
"(a) The production of L.P.G. from the Maui and Kapuni 
fields should be combined so that effectively there 
will be a single supplying entity. 
(b) A national bulk distribution system should be 
established ... 
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(c) There should be an assured supply of L.P.G. to the South 
Island. 
(d) A common bulk price should operate ex ... main ports 
in the South Island, so that South Island consumers 
can gain direct benefit from the North Island gas 
fields ... 11 (Adams-Schneider, 1980:2617). 
1979 on: Calculation of forecasted demand for L.P.G. by Planning 
Division, Ministry of Energy. These calculations effectively 
become basis of oil companies' and Liquigas's planning (for 
example, compare Ministry of Energy, 1981:56 and op cit:59) . 
.. 
Anticipated initial market development of 110,000 tonnes per 
annum by the late 1980's. Capacity of ship, storage etc. based 
on this (Liquigas, 1981:4). 
1979, November: B.P. (N.l.) Ltd reveals intentions to build a bulk 
L.P.G. storage installation in Lyttelton on the Naval Point 
reclamation area. 
1979, November 23: Lyttelton Borough Council (L.B.C.) makes submissions 
to Parliamentary Select Committee on the proposed National 
Development Bill (1979), expressing concern that the Bill might 
be used for the' L.P.G. proposal - thus depriving the L.B.C. 
:.:- .. 
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of its controlling functions bestowed by the Town and Country 
Planning Act (1977) (T~C.P.A., 1977). The L.B.C. was "assured 
that the L.P.G. project was too small for the National Develop-
ment Bill and that as long as there was provision for L.P.G. 
in ... (the} ... District Scheme, then any L.P.G. proposal would 
go through normal town and country planning procedures" 
(Cretney, 1982:2). 
1979, late: L.B.C. IS town planning consultants instructed to ensure 
provision made in the District Sch~me (then under review) for 
any L.P.G. proposal (op cit: appendix one:1). 
1980, March 4: B.P.(N.Z.} Ltd lodges application for planning consent 
(under T.&C.P.A., 1977) to construct and operate a bulk storage 
facility on Naval Point property. 
1980, March 6: B.P.(N.Z.} Ltd withdrew application for planning consent. 
Reason a source of mystery and some suspicion later. 
1980, June 19: Meeting convened by B.P.(N.Z.} Ltd with Christchurch 
local authorities, to outline several options for storage and 
distribution facilities - all involving use of inner harbour 
oil wharf at Lyttelton, the wharfls use being the focus of 
concern and criticism in the local community (loc cit). 
1980, June, July: Telephone survey of nearly 200 residents living in 
Lyttelton and Woolston conducted by the Auckland Research Group 
for B.P.(N.Z.} Ltd recorded that 52% of Lyttelton respondents 
indicated that they would not be "willing to have a L.P.G. 
storage depot in ... (their) ... area. 11 (Glazer, 1982:4). 
1980, October 16: Plans revealed to public which broadly correspond 
to plans being implemented. 
'1980, November 18: Crystallising of community dissent. Public meeting 
attended by 150 residents and L.P.G. Action Committee formed. 
Councillor Cretney 1 ater reported that lIextreme concern was 
expressed ... about the proposed off-loading of L.P.G. at the 
present dangerous goods wharf ... 11 and that IImany were also 
worried about public participation in the decision-making and 
were assured by myself that there would be a town planning 
hearing where any individual or groups ... would have the 
opportuni ty to express thei r concerns II (Cretney, 1982: 2) . 
1980, November 20: Lyttelton's mayor reinforced assurances concerning 
use of and accessibility rendered by the T.&C.P.A. (1977); 
indicated IIsafety ... would be a prime factor in considering 
any application ll ('The Star l 20 Nov, 1980). 
6 
1980, December 16: News release for IILiquigas Group" suggested that 
applications for planning consent pursuant to T.&C.P.A. (1977) 
would go to local authorities IIpossibly in mid-March ll • Also 
indicated that IIlocal residents groups ... (would be) 
consu lted fi rs t II ( Cretney, 1982: append i x two) . 
.. 
1980, December: Petroleum Amendment Bill (2) 1980 passed through 
parliament to become law: this legislation gave the potential 
for the pipeline to be authorised outside town planning controls. 
Subsequently all parties to these events express ignorance of 
its potential relevance at the time of its passage. 
1981, March 2: Liquigas advises L.B.C. of Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 
1980 ' s passage, relevance and their intention to go directly 
to the Minister of Energy for approval under its provisions 
incorporated in Petroleum Act (1937) (op cit: appendix one:1). 
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1981, March/April: L.B.C. seek legal advice and begin consultation with 
Minister of Energy and Liquigas about impact of new act 
(loc ci t) . 
1981, April 1: L.P.G. Action Committee launches petition to keep tankers 
out of inner harbour area (op cit:2). 
1981, April 8: Liquigas and L.B.C.meet - Liquigas indicates preparedness 
to ask Minister for Commission of Inquiry under s. 54 of 
Petroleum Act (1937), a request the Minister could not refuse, 
given ss 54 (I) (op cit:appendix one:2). 
1981, April to July~ L.B.C. continue representation to and discussions 
with Minister of Energy, and Mines Department concerning 
comniission requiring (1) right for residents to be heard and 
(2) inclusion of transfer and wharf facilities in the definition 
of "pipeline", and thus a subject of the Inquiry (Lyttelton 
Harbour Board had given its permission for use of the wharf). 
By July, Minister rejected both requirements," based on his 
interpretation of P.A.A. (2) 1980 (op cit:appendix one:2-3). 
1981, August 1~ L.B.C. lodges writ in the High Court challenging 
Minister's interpretation of P.A.A. (2) (op cit:appendix one:3). 
1981, September: Parliamentary Committee on Commerce and Energy hear 
petition and submissions on the same (loc cit). (Petition 
signed by over 60% of Lyttelton's adult population). 
1981, October 2: Liquigas apply to Heathcote County Council for planning 
consent for Woolston storage and distribution facility. 
Commissioner appointed to hear application and objections. 
1981, November 11: Public learn that petition has lapsed because 
Commerce and Ene·rgy Committee did not report back to Parl iament 
8 
by the end of the session. Mayor Foster is amongst outcry: 
"we consider it a gross discourtesy ... that all ... (the) ... 
work has been effectively wasted because a decision was not 
made" ('The Press' 11 November, 1981). A 'Star' editorial 
states "it really does look as if the petition was shuffled 
to the bottom of the pile for political purposes ... " and 
" ... (it is) ... an affront to democracy" ('The Star' 12 
November, 1981). 
1981, December 7: Liquigas finally apply to the Minister of Energy for 
pipeline authorisation pursuant to the Petroleum Act (1937) 
and request the Minister to set up a Commission of Inquiry. 
1982, March 10: Commissioner appointed by Heathcote County Council 
recommends consent be given to Woolston application. Only the 
pipeline itself remained to be 'approved'. 
1982, May 17: After over a year of 'bargaining', the Minister announces 
terms of reference for enquiry - they are broad, incorporating 
the L.B.C.'s requirements. The High Court writ is dropped 
('The Star' 17 May, 1982). 
1982, June 17: Commission's proceedings formally open in Christchurch. 
Adversary procedure adopted incorporating inquisitorial 
function. 
1982, November 18: Commission concludes after 53 sitting days and 
68 witnesses. 
1983, January: Report made public. Recommended to Minister, partially 
subject to various recommendations and conditions, that 
Liquigas be granted authorisation to construct and operate 
proposed pipeline (Commission of Inquiry report, 1982). 
9 
. 1.3 THE CASE-STUDY: DISCUSSION 
1. 3.1 Introduction 
In this section the intention is to identify and discuss 
features of the case-study events and circumstances that pertain to the 
goal of this report - to investigate the role of public participation 
in planning. 
There are two problems immediately raised involving the scope 
of this discussion. They extend from the previously mentioned assertion 
that the nature and role of both public participation and planning are 
problematic in this study, in addition to the question posed by the goal. 
It would be pre-emptive of later stages of this study to definitively 
deal with these problematic points. (It would also, in fact, limit the 
util ity of the framework adopted in Chapter 2.) The orientation thus 
must allow for a wide consideration of interpretations as regards both 
the essence and role of both participation and planning. The prime 
danger at this stage is undesirable delimitation of investigation and 
thus wide scope of consideration of the two concepts is both desirable 
and allowed for. The consequence of this extends from that, at the 
time when it is desirable to 'bound' the discussion, the above imperatives 
suggest again~t this: thus the discussion cannot be considered comprehen-
sive in any sense - it should be treated as simply a selection of what 
I consider to be principal relevant points pertaining to the goal. 
The main difficulty with the scope of 'planning' relates to 
whether to isolate the activities and rationalities of planning and 
politics and attempt to treat them separately. The separation and thus 
their isolation in consideration of these events is conceivable but 
considered ill-advised. Public participation raises issues that are 
fundamentally political or ideological. To consider planning solely 
as an apolitial activity or to consider only the apolitical aspects of 
............ 
•••••• _ •• '.-0,., ••• , •• 
. planning will effectively suppress the fundamental issues raised by 
public participation. 
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At another level, 'identification of these separate rationalities 
in the practice of 'planning' regarding these case-study events is 
frequently seemingly impossible - such is characteristic particularly 
of contemporary development planning in New Zealand. In effect the 
rationalities intermix: whether one considers this undesirable from 
the point of view of regrettable sUbsummation of either planning or 
political rationality by the other or whether one considers it simply 
inevitable (matters returned to later), the reality must be acknowledged. 
Thus the avoidance of undesirable delimitation of this 
discussion insists that the consideration of planning does not exclude 
the interaction of pl~nning with political rationality. Similarly, 
consideration of what might constitute public participation is broad 
and left reasonably ope~ - in effect, no effort is made to state what 
public participation, in essence, is. It is all too easy to take a 
hortatorical stance as regards what public participation is and is not 
as the literature both observes and attests to. The error in this is 
the inherent preclusion of whole ranges of opinion about how the public 
(whoever they.,are precisely) 'take part', and the related ignoring of 
ranges of political theories of governance and democracy, which both· 
reflect and inform that opinion. 
Thus, the idea of public participation by representation is not 
excluded, antagonistic as this is to many conceptions of public participa-
tion. Similarly, no attempt is made to confine the conception of 
participation by discriminating according to such as purpose, form, 
motivation, consistency, intensity or degree of deliberativeness. 
The approach initially is to consider successively the events 
pertaining to location-specific plans, portrayed here as 'the process', 
by which plans evolved from policy and goal formulation to approval. 
It is to be emphasized that in using the 'process' below, the reference 
is to the particular events and not to the institutional approval 
process per se, although it obviously relates to this. 
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The focus is on public participation - how and where it could 
be considered to have occurred and to have been limited by the process 
and a depiction of its implied role and the interaction between it and 
the process. The intention of this discussion is to give a basis for 
later analysis and characterisation of the inherent role of public 
participation in the process. The phases of the process considered 
are: 
1. 3.2 
(i) policy and goal formulation 
(ii) development of plans 
(iii) the planning approval procedures 
- evolution of planning approval procedures 
- the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 and the 
Commission of Inquiry 
Policy and- Goal Formulation 
The focus of concern of this case-study relates to location-
specific plans. Policy formulation, which occurred at the national, 
governmental level, is clearly relevant but consideration in terms of 
location-specific planning was effectively thwarted at this level of 
the process by the I remoteness I of goals, objectives, and particularly, 
actual plans. In the particular context of the type of development 
planning involved here, it is unrealistic to consider there is a basis 
for anything other than consideration of impacts in general or scenario-
based terms. This basis is dubious for 'meaningful I consideration of 
project-level developments because of the essentially speculative 
nature of possible developments. Consequently, public participation is 
not considered here relating to this stage of the process. 
This is not of course to say that public participation at the 
stage of policy formulation is not possible - in fact it occurred in 
~everal forms. Nor is this to say that efforts to envisage 
'down-stream' consequences of policies cannot be undertaken. It can 
be noted that the higher the level of policy formulation, that is the 
more centralised the policy-making, the more this effect will occur. 
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The dilemma in this is that energy planning needs considerable centralised 
co-ordination. 
Goal formulation concerning the production, distribution and 
pricing of L.P.G. was primarily in the hands of the Government, although 
some degree of collaboration with the six promoters of Liquigas can be 
inferred, particul arly from the "White Paper on Li quigas Assurances II 
(Minister of Energy, 1981). At this level of the process there is a 
basis for consideration of location-specific plans given that specifica-
tion that a sea-fed. facility be de~eloped "preferably at Lyttelton/ 
Christchurch ... " (op cit:6) evolved at this stage. 
Participation could perhaps be considered to have occurred in 
three respects. The first type can be called participation by national 
governmental representation. The reference here is to the notion that a 
government represents the nation, as opposed to parliamentary representa-
tion where individual M.P.s represent electorates. It has a political 
mandate basis which is the source of a fundamental inadequacy in terms of 
.' 
authority in relation to location-specific planning: the mandate, along 
with the accompanying exercise of authority and basis of accountability 
has its basis in the national polity. Thus the representation of the 
impacted community in the case-study is on a par with all other communities 
and yet, obviously, the costs and benefits are unequally shared. 
The issue of this inadequacy is a characteristic feature of 
development planning, where policy formulation and consequences, 
particularly negative consequences, pertain to widely varying population 
scales. From the point of view of political authority, the downstream 
project investigation and approval procedures stand to ameliorate and 
perhaps overcome this inadequacy by the exercise of a 'weighted ' community 
.say. In relation to the events under consideration here, the degree 
to which this inadequacy remains is of central concern. It is to be 
noted that the above-mentioned remoteness of policy and project have 
placed a burden on this 'illegitimate' basis. 
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The second type of participation which could be considered to 
have occurred is by parliamentary electorate representation. This has 
a significantly better authority basis for the representation of an 
-impacted community given that the scale of representation is likely to 
be appropriate to the scale of the impact, and, in relation to the 
case-study circumstances, this is so. 
However, this considered form of participation is severely 
limited, at least in the context of New Zealand governmental procedure. 
The central issues here relate to the effectiveness of parliament and 
legislative functions and the independence of the latter from executive 
functions. These issues have been the subject of much recent debate 
(see, for example, Palmer, 1979: Chapter 1; Hoadley (ed), 1979) and need 
not be reiterated here. However, parliament's generally conceded 
impotence in relation to decision-making is to be noted - in effect, 
potential legislative decision-making effectiveness is subsumed by 
executive power. The possible role of parliamentary representation, 
.--
and thus this considered type of participation, is limited by the minor 
possibilities for influence and reform that parliamentary and select 
committee involvement provide. These limited possibilities themselves 
are hindered by the "cloak of secrecy ... (which) ... covers everything 
of any importance in the decision-making structure" (Palmer, 1979:10). 
It is the lack of openness of intention and action on the part 
of the executive domain that explains the actual minimal role of this 
considered form of participation in relation to goal formulation. The 
fact is that the goals were internally generated by the Government and 
not subject to anyone's knowledge, and hence scrutiny, before they were 
transmitted as "policy" to the Commerce Commission (see sequence). The 
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"function of this considered form of participation, especially given that 
the case-study community's representative was a member of the Opposition, 
was relegated to the level of simple response to a 'fait accompli I -
the function could be described as participation by electoral representa-
tive objection. 
Another form of what might be considered participation 
occurred by virtue of the fact that the public were informed of the 
goals in the "White Paper on Liquigas Assurances". This can be depicted 
as participation as one-way information. The particular example related 
here must be considered of minimal importance in the Lyttelton planning 
process as actual planning had reached the stage of firm proposals over 
eighteen months previously. (The text of the "White Paper on Liquigas 
Assurances" was released in mid-1981.) This delay in the one-way 
information flow effectively prevented it from being the basis for two-
way communication which might have resulted from representative, 
interest group or individual response via the media, Parliament or 
directly to the Minister, Ministry of Energy or Liquigas. It was of low 
pertinence by the time of its release: actual plans were being discussed. 
No participation in the form of consultation or dialogue with 
the community.of Lyttelton or its representatives appears to have 
occurred in the course of goal formulation. 
1.3.3 Development of Plans 
The 'development of plans was principally in the hands of 
Liquigas, although the objectives pertaining to capacities of facilities 
were 'handed down I from the national level in the form of forecasted 
estimates from the Planning Division, Ministry of Energy (see Sequence). 
This, to the small degree that it was based on actual market performance, 
could be regarded as a form of participation by survey. 
Liquigas'~ actual planning to the stage of the formulation of 
the first plan being submitted for consent in November, 1979 seems to 
:.'.',". ~'.~.:-:,~:",~ 
~:{~~:t~:~:~-~~ 
. have been devoid of any extra-consortium involvement. There was 
apparently no infiormation or consultation pertaining to the evolution 
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of these plans, yet it is to be noted that this was the period in which 
alternatives of where to bring L.P.G. ashore in Canterbury inclusive 
of the choice of form and location of berthage were investigated and 
decided upon; this stage then, is of prime concern to the consideration 
of planning rationality. 
To give this initial Il ow profile l and later actions appropriate 
explanatory context we can begin by noting that Liquigas is fundamentally 
a private enterprise consortium. Within the bounds of th~ restraints of 
the consortium1s relationship with the New Zealand Government, as well 
revealed by the IWhite Paperl and inclusive of the influence of 
considerable financial dependence o~ the Government, Liquigas1s prime 
motive is profit-maximisation - or loss-minimisation. Its vision is 
self-regarding and brings to the fore decision-making criteria which 
stress efficiency, defined essentially in financial terms, rapidity and 
certainty of implementation. While Liquigas cannot be expected to 
orient its decision-making or any other activity primarily to the Ipublic 
interest l , there are two factors which influence its attitude. 
The~first derives from its collaboration with the Government. 
Government1s policies considerably determine and constrain Liquigas1s 
existence and operation (see Sequence; Adams-Schneider, 1980:2617; 
Ministry of Energy:1980). An important base to the collaborative 
relationship is the Government1s large financial involvement in the 
overall project. This occurs in two ways. Firstly, the Government is 
involved through the 25 percent shareholding of Offshore Mining Company 
Limited. Secondly, the Government has arranged for considerable state 
assistance for Liquigas particularly in relation to its South Island 
developments which include tax write-offs for storage tanks, suspensory 
loans IIdesigned to increase South Island deliveries ll , grants covering 
25 percent of costs for storage vessels under the Gas Development Grant 
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scheme and other undisclosed assistance ('The Press' 12 March, 1982). 
It is clear that Liquigas cannot and will not act without consideration 
to the government's interest. 
It thus is pertinent to consider what might be the effect of 
national government's 'interest'. Particularly with their financial 
involvement they will be interested in economic efficiency. Their 
interest in rapidity stems both from this and the electoral costs of 
delay,s, particularly considering this is an energy project and due to be 
completed in an election year. This latter interest also brings the 
desire for certainty of implementation. These three factors are shared 
in common with Liquigas. But there is a fourth factor - legitimacy: 
the Government, to the extent that it might be perceived to be a party 
to the development by the polity, or otherwise responsible for it, 
cannot be seen to be riding rough-shod over communities. This 
compounds the next point. 
The second factor which influences Liquigas's attitude to the 
public and public involvement relates to and extends from what can be 
portrayed as a dilemma. On the one hand Liquigas desires and possibly 
needs certain levels of support and consent. Widespread dissent may 
bring marketing difficulties, industrial and other unrest and raise the 
difficulty and cost of gaining approval, if not preventing it. Liquigas 
failed to obtain planning consent in Onehunga for a bulk storage depot 
in 1979 amidst considerable public dissent (Auckland Research Group, 
1982:2). 
On the other hand, interaction with the public may produce 
unacceptable hindrance and difficulty in the form of costs and delays. 
It may also raise demands that are contradictory, illogical and 
irreconcilable with either each other or the particular perceived 
constraints deriving from Liquigas's operational imperatives~ 
Liquigas's above-mentioned lack of consultation and paucity 
of information concerning initial planning can be seen as part of a 
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strategy for partially escaping from the dilemma outlined. Delaying 
the announcement and detail of plans avoids possible adverse discussion 
and forms of dissent. There is of course a danger in this strategy, 
that for Liquigas in New Zealand has complicated the above-described 
dilemma. Withholding information and intentions runs the risk of 
creating and stimulating feelings of mistrust which may persist. 
Nevertheless, Liquigas has made a habit of such delay. 
Liquigas's release of consultants' safety assessments and planning 
consent documents pertaining to all intended New Zealand installations 
has generally been left until immediately before consent procedures 
commence, although in the case of the safety assessments, it is clear 
that they all became available in 1982. Although somewhat arguable, 
it can be suggested that the delayed informing of the Lyttelton Borough 
Council about the applicability of the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 
until Liquigas had resolved that they would use it, also conforms to 
this strategy (see Sequence). 
Such a strategy clearly hinders the informing and reaction of 
interested or concerned parties in addition to the above-noted potential 
for interpretations of secrecy and feelings of mistrust. And perhaps 
most importantly it effectively stifles public debate of alternatives 
before the presentation to the public of a firm proposal. The gain for 
Liquigas in terms of the above-identified operational imperatives is 
arguable as 'history' attests: the subsequent attention to alternative 
schemes by 'opposition' groups and individuals and the obliged defence 
by Liquigas of the selected proposals has involved considerable 
time and cost. 
After plans were submitted for consent in March, 1980, 
Liquigas's public communication became considerable and took several 
forms. Considerable consultation with local authorities and prominent 
and concerned residents' associations occurred. It is difficult to 
depict the precise function of this considered form of public participation 
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by consultation - was there any possibility of change of plans as a 
consequence of these consultations? Or was the role conceived of for 
public participation simply that of placation? Or again, was the 
motive to 'convert' the audience in some sense? There is the 
possibility that Liquigas reacts, at least, to dissenting voices, 
particularly regarding the eventual decision to remove the site of the 
storage depot from Lyttelton to Woolston. However, discounting the 
above possibility in relation to this decision is the fact that at the 
• 
time of the withdrawal of the application for town and country planning 
consent of March 6th, 1980 (see Sequence), there was little, if any 
public dissent in Lyttelton, and I know of no public opinion surveys 
that had been done at this time which may have given an indication of 
a s'ignificant dissent level., 
Distinguishable from the consultative function, although 
related, is an information function. In relation to both the time 
leading up to both the Heathcote County Council town and country planning 
hearing and the Commission of Inquiry in Christchurch, Liquigas's informa-
tion to the public and involved authorities was comprehensive. The 
planning documents and their appendices were inclusive of the widest 
range of information which was generally well presented and organised. 
Availability of these documents was good, with their supply to all 
libraries, interest groups, local authorities and many individuals known 
to be concerned being undertaken on the initiative of Liquigas. 
Additionally, Liquigas widely circulated two pamphlets, held a display 
in Cathedral Square and held several meetings with concerned groups. 
In order to assess the conceived role of these efforts one 
important fact must be kept in mind: the development of the plans for 
all intents and purposes was finished. It can therefore be considered 
that the role of this considerable effort was to explain and justify 
decisions already taken; the orientation to convince the audience of 
.the wisdom of planning pursued henceforth. The above functions can 
be labelled public participation as public relations, and to some 
extent, public participation as propaganda. 
1.3.4 Planning Approval Procedures 
1.3.4.1 Evolution of planning approval procedures 
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As is apparent from the earlier-related sequence of events, 
the procedure by which plans were to seek approval evolved during the 
period of the development of plans. The fact of this evolution and 
manner of it raises several points of concern relating to the involve-
ment of the public. 
Firstly, it is noted that in general terms uncertainty of 
such as approval procedu~es essentially brings negative aspects. 
Clearly, parties wishing to make preparations for the pursuance of their 
particular interests are hindered in such preparations. This hindrance 
potentially falls on all parties. A developer may be affected by such 
as not knowing when, in what terms, and to whom he may have to defend 
his proposals. Various representatives and interest groups will be 
unsure as to when and. in what terms they may have an opportunity to 
present their case - or indeed whether any such opportunity, or 
sufficient opportunity will be provided. The potential for 'unnecessary' 
and possibly inflammatory extra-institutional action is apparent. 
Still talking in general terms it can be noted that if one 
party i,s in less of a position of uncertainty then an advantage accrues 
to that party. Similarly, if the degree of uncertainty is to some extent 
able to be controlled or influenced by one party then advantage accrues 
to that party. 
In the Lyttelton situation, as has been related above, the 
principal representative body for the community, the Lyttelton Borough 
Council, believed, and was assured in its belief, that established Town 
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and Country Planning Act (1977) procedures would determine approval. 
In addition to providing for representations from interested parties, 
this 'pathway' assured the Council of some control, an exercise of its 
authority. The Council used the prospect of this 'pathway' to assure 
residents that due provision would prevail for them to put their case. 
The surveys related earlier indicate that a consistent 
majoritarian opposition existed in the community throughout and after 
the period in which approval procedures were evolving. This opposition 
cannot be explained with certainty. However, it is suggested that the 
long period that ensued before the public knew of the precise nature 
and timing of approval procedures may have contributed to the develop-
ment of this opposition, as is perhaps reflected in the previously noted 
growing dissent inJhe latter part of 1980 in the Lyttelton community. 
Similarly, it can be suggested that the change from earlier 
indicated procedures to those pursuant to the amended Petroleum Act 
(1937) contain at least the potential to generate senses of manipulation 
and mistrust amongst those members of the community, including their 
local representatives, concerned with the proposals, towards perceived 
proponents. Although there is no indication of such an effect in the 
Lyttelton context, the change in approval procedures had the potential 
for some of the engendered mistrust to fall upon the Council-citizen 
relationship. 
It is perhaps too harsh to suggest that the uncertainty in 
approval procedures represents an orchestrated strategy. However, it 
is, at least, regrettable that the Lyttelton Borough Council remained 
in ignorance of the significance of the new Petroleum Amendment Act 
(2) (1980). It has already been noted that until Liquigas had actually 
resolved to apply for approval under the provisions of the Act, it seems 
that the Gonsortium was content to leave the Lyttelton Borough Council 
believing that approval would be granted under the provisions of ,the 
Town and Country Planning Act. Obviously, at some stage before this 
-time Liquigas had. become aware of the possibility of using the 
Petroleum Act (1937). 
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Uncertainty as regards the manner in which development 
projects are to be approved, then, brings with it considerable potential 
for frustration and mistrust between parties involved. These negative 
aspects are exacerbated when it seems likely or is apparent that some 
parties in a development issue have information relating to a procedure 
to be used that other parties do not share. It can be noted that, 
while uncertainty as strategy is perhaps not part of established 
political development method in New Zealand, uncertainty, as regards 
approval procedures to be used, is certainly a frequent phenomenon. 
The utilitarian dysfunction of uncertainty to the basis for 
considered forms of public participation has been emphasized, but moral 
issues are close to the surface: can uncertainty regarding planning 
approval procedures be countenanced as acceptable in terms of planning 
or governmental principle? 
1.3.4.2 The Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 
The Petroleum Act (1937) emerged as the vehicle whereby 
planning appruval was to be given - it enables the Minister of Energy 
to authorize certain pipelines of the dimensions of the Lyttelton-
Woolston facility. 
This Act can be seen as one product in a now consolidated 
- tradition of such statutes spawned by contemporary Government which 
collectively are transforming traditional planning procedures and have 
considerable implications for development plannin~ generally. As with 
the National Development Act (1979), the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 
1980 incorporates considerable executive ability to bypass established 
planning traditions. The Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980, particularly 
in the inherent extension of executive control represents a particular 
._~"._:":.'"->-.... ;:-'a,: 
~~:::'.:2:::;;.:;~::: 
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22 
. interpretation of the role of government in planning, inclusive of an 
implied role for considered forms of public participation. 
Before considering the particular provisions, the onus that 
is upon the Act is to be noted. The Act enables the authorisation of 
I 
) pipelines independent of all statutory controls.( Thus, to the extent 
that the project is to be subject to appraisal and scrutiny the Act 
determines that its provisions are the sole means for such functions 
I 
to be effected. ) Additionally, it has already been established that, to 
the degree that the impacted community is to be regarded to any greater 
extent than the national population, that regard is to be incorporated 
in investigation and approval arrangements - the entire onus for this 
regard of community opinion falls upon the Act. 
An initial concern stems from the fact that the Act is merely 
an approval procedure. This orientation stands to limit attention to 
the particular plans rather than broader contextual considerations such 
as the need for the project and, particularly, alternatives to the plans. 
The Act provides for the requirement that every application for a pipeline 
authorisation shall include certain detail and be accompanied by a 
report setting out its effects (s.51), but there is no requirement for 
such as its rQlative merit in relation to alternatives. 
More significantly, the fact that it is simply an approval 
mechanism was instrumental in determining the provisions ofs.54(2) and 
s.55: at the end of the day, neither the Minister nor any Commission 
of Inquiry can approve or recommend respectively any alternatives to 
the plans. While the proponent's report, the Minister's consideration, 
and any Commission of Inquiry's proceedings are not necessarily prevented 
from considering the wider contextual issues, the focus on a particular 
plan stands to bound the scope of consideration. From a planner's 
point of view, this focus deprives what can be considered a central 
point of planning rationality ensconced in and accepted as basic planning 
.'~ 
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method, namely scrutiny of alternatives. From an opposing community's 
point of view, the focus means the procedure is, at best, not centrally 
concerned with the community's desires and opinions. Of particular 
concern in relation to the Lyttelton events, is that the question of 
alternative berthing arrangements was at the heart of community concern -
the focus on approval stands to, and actually does, inhibit the 
consideration of at least this central point of concern to the community. 
The focus determines that elements of public participation that are 
critical of the plans adopt a negative stance - there is little room 
for or purpose in constructive criticism. As far as public participa-
tion in the Commission of Inquiry by the generally opposing Lyttelton 
.. /'. 
community is concerned,(involvement had only the potential to be public 
\ )parti~ipation as negatively-oriented objection~ The consequence of the 
converse is that the proponents couldn't be expected to air reservations 
or receive suggestions. Is not this opportunity for public participation 
doomed to be emphasized by destructiveness, distortion and antagonism? 
Of central concern in consideration of the role considered 
------~-' forms of public participation play, is the control and considerable 
----di scretion-ary--powerbes"towecf o-n-tne~Ml'iifSre'r--~;~tb~·Act. Under s. 55 
the Minister.alone decides on the granting or refusal of any application 
and his decision is final. (Even th'e--fimit'ed'appeal provisions of the 
National Development Act (1979) are not matched. )'He is the unchallenge-
---'abl e _ (irbiter of t~~._~.Uhli~lnteres t'. 'lhe"'import of s. 55 in the 
consideration of public participation is that all considered forms of 
public participation other than that labelled earlier as public participa-
tion as national governmental representation are prescr-n:ied a role which 
is non-inclusive of decisi,9JJ-making. 
Given that it has previously been asserted that national 
governmental representation has an inadequate authority basis in terms 
of the case-study events, the significance of s.55 is considerable: 
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the complete deprivation of all non-Ministerial decision-making 
responsibility represents an exercise of power rather than authority. 
Comp9und ing this unsatisfactory situation in regard to the case-study 
is the consideration that the Government, and particularly the Minister, 
are hardly disinterested parties regarding the outcome. 
Other pro.vls.i.ons extend the power of the Minister further in 
~----.--.-
hi s monopoly on dec;::i sion,..ma~ing·:N-"~S<:-66(1) gives him total di scretion 
_u· -- . _" _. __ ., 'T.-_ ... ,"~L_~"-'---"'"-
to amend or revoke terms and .. condi-tions.oLany authorisation having 
be~n~i.ve_n.. InG.identa lly,. the Actpr€sori bes exp1 i cit1y here that he 
is to decide the 'public interest'. S.60(1) gives him total discretion 
regarding possible changes to the pipeline route after any authorisation 
has been given. Similarly, s.59 allows for Ministerial discretion 
concerning deviations, changes, extensions or reductions to an approved 
pipeline and this may involve overriding of the provisions of Part II 
of the Act if modification is "not of a significant nature" and lias he 
thinks fit" (s.59(2)). S .. 88(4)e~e}~lp!~ the Minister, in making an 
"-""n"r-,,_ ~ __ _ 
-~.--.~--'"' --"'--O __ "--"".".~-c __ ' • 
authorisation, from requirements oC~Qn?lJltati()~ ~ndapprova1 from 
local authori tiesamLother Ministers respecti ve1y,embod'ied"ori gi na 11y 
in s.29 of the 'mother' Petroleum Act (1937). These requirements 
constitute, ynder the mother Act, an important safeguard for a wide 
range of lands inclusive of National Parks, public reserves, marine 
reserves, Maori reservations,state forests, wildlife refuges and 
sanctuaries, railway land, soil conservation reserves, foreshore, seabed 
and lake and river beds. This provision of s.88(4} must be considered 
an abandonment of an important established safeguard. 
1.3.4.3 The Commission of Inquiry 
For the issue of public participation the provisions of the 
Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 relating to Commissions of Inquiry are 
of considerable importance. I have already suggested that the approval 
procedural orientation, reinforced by the provisions of s.54(2) and s.55, 
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preclude to a large degree the possibility of a constructive, positive, 
co-operative and even honest basis. The participatory roles are cast 
for a fight, not dialogue. In the not unlikely event in development 
planning where the Minister is not disinterested in the success of the 
application, those objecting have the ogre of s.55, which bestows the 
Minister as the unchallengeable referee, threatening the likely prospect 
of loss. But this important procedural exercise is, generally, even 
more circumscribed: the fight may not even take place: 
Under the provisions of s.54(1), a Commission of Inquiry can 
only be initiated by the Minister, in his discretion, or the applicant .. ' 
In relation to the latter case~ the subsection requires of the Minister 
to refer the application to a Commission of Inquiry if so requested by 
the applicant. The logic inherent ~eneral1y in this subsection has 
considerable implications for the issue of public involvement in relation 
I 
to this Act, given that the Commission of Inquiry is the sole provision 
for formal pub1ic~h.~a.r.t~g relating to the subject of any application: 
..... t>-< __ ....................... -=-~J---'-~--··,;c."'--
the logic is that a pub1 ic.right to ~. hearing or "investig~tion ot~er 
than that which the applicant is required to undertake pursuant to s.51 
(mentioned above), simply does not exist. The issue is to be decided 
by the proponent andJ,ttnis.t~r, who in the case-study at least, as already 
.. -'_n~ ___ , __ ~ .--.-,>4~~_~_~ .,' .~~l_ . ____ , _~_., "." ,J"'-
noted, is hardly disinterested. In terms of what can be considered 
established planning principle as incorporated in, for example, successive 
town and country planning legislation regarding hearing and appeal 
provisions pertaining to both scheme preparation and consents, this is 
remarkable. Effectively, to the extent that the Minister is not 
disinterested, the whole basis for a Commission of Inquiry, and thus the 
forms of public participation it provides for, rests on the will and 
desires of the project advocates. 
Additionally, it is to be noted that the Minister ,both sets 
'\ \ the terms of reference for any Inquiry and chooses the Commissioners 
(see Sequence) . 
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As the sequence reveals, the terms of reference became 
something of a political football. Like the hearing itself, the 
Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 effectively determines that no rights 
exist except for the proponents and Minister. If any other party has 
any part in the determination of these matters, it is in terms of a 
political dog-fight. The question asked: is this a good basis for 
the determination of an important aspect of public involvement? 
Relating to the Ministerial appointment of Commissioners, it 
must be asked whether, given the contended lack of disinterest at least 
in relation to the case-study events, such appointment is satisfactory. 
A concern relates to the majority appointment of engineers to the 
.Commission, when a central issue was that of safety. Judgements concerning 
such issues are 0llen to both subjective and objective interpretations. 
The issue of what interpretation is to be emphasized is important and 
crucial to major conclusions. People trained in technically-oriented 
trades and professions are likely to emphasize objective interpretations 
and, at worst, dismiss arguments based on subjective interpretation as 
i rre 1 evant. 
The Commissioners eventually concluded that both the pipe-
line and ship/shore interface facility would "have minimal adverse 
effects on the social environment ... " (Commission of Inquiry Report, 
1982:280 and 283). Can this not be considered a nonsense when it is 
unchallenged that the majority of Lyttelton residents are concerned 
that it is dangerous? Has not lithe social environment" anything to 
do with people's consciousness? Is not the majority appointment of 
engineers 'mobilization of bias' against an interpretative mode that is 
consistent with the idea that, put bluntly, the determination of social 
welfare might bear some correspondence to what affected groups consider 
is their welfare? 
Briefly, other general characteristics of the case-study 
Commission of Inquiry are to be noted pertaining to further considered 
:'.'.'." ".'> .:-~-;-
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limitations on the role and scope for various participating parties. 
Most of the characteristics relate to the limitations on those 
opposing the application consisting of representatives, organisations, 
trade unions, interest groups and individuals principally from the 
Lyttelton area. The basis on which they presented their case must be 
described as unfair. 
Financial ability to hire lawyers, and expert witnesses was ',\\ 
severely restricted, compounded particularly by the long duration of 
the hearing. The reserves set aside by groups quickly ran out and had 
some parties withdrawing legal representation and even lay presence, 
while the Lyttelton Borough Council embarked on a street appeal in the 
small community and canvassing of other local authorities. A Government 
grant eased the L.B.C.'s difficulties to some extent, but a "shortfall 
of several thousand dollars'" (Commission of Inquiry Report, 1982:298) 
resulted. I understand the total costs to the L.B.C. to be near 
i $20,000. A comparative figure of expenditure for Liquigas is unavailab1d 
but based on hearsay, lawyers and likely witness, consultants fees and 
costs, I would estimate it to be in excess of $800,000. 
The 'catchment' for the six witnesses for the L.B.C. was the 
Christchurch area, whereas several of Liquigas's twenty-five witnesses 
.. 
came from Europe and North America. Despite several instances of 
successful challenges of sometimes central Liquigas evidence by L.B.C. 
witnesses, the disadvantage in terms of expertise and resources was 
evident. 
The semi-legal foundation of proceedings and the relatively 
formal adversaria1 atmosphere was not readily conducive to lay involve-
ment. It has already been suggested that it was also not particularly 
conducive to constructive and honest dialogue. 
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. 1.4 END COMMENTS 
This case-study concerns the process by which certain 
development proposals evolved from policy formulation to approval. 
The above account has focussed on portraying features of the process 
relating to how particularly the people of the impacted community 
might be considered to have 'taken part'. A central intent, thus, 
has been to depict the inherent role prescribed for public participa-
tion. The central question on which the remainder of this study 
focusses is whether that role is appropriate. 
In approaching this question, it is to be recalled that it 
involves three interrelated problematic subjects, none of which have 
thus far been 'resolved'. These subjects can be related to the case-
study events. 
Briefly, do all or any of the considered forms of public 
particiaption, or do they taken collectively, constitute appropriate 
public participation? Perhaps most importantly, did the deprived 
direct decision-making role of the impacted community negate the 
essence of public participation? Relating to the goal, did such as 
the deprived decision-making role of the local community diminish the 
utility of ~ublic participation to planning in some sense? The New 
Zealand Planning Council (1978:80) has considered "that greater 
efficiency will be achieved not by edict but by the greater involvement 
of citizens in the decisions that have to be taken". Does that mean 
in decision-making? If so, did planning efficiency suffer in Lyttelton? 
What is the meaning of this and should planners and society be concerned 
on utilitarian grounds at the re-iterated position of contemporary 
Government Ministers that natural resource decision-making should 
solely be the province of government (for example, see 'The Dominion ' 
28 November, 1983). 
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Then there is the other side: whatever the answer to such 
utilitarian-orientated questions, should planners and planning be 
c~ncerned at such legislative arrangements and Ministerial pronounce-
ments on moral grounds? Does public participation raise matters of 
principle for planners and planning? Such questions relate to the 
problematic subject concerning the nature and essence of planning as 
wi 11 be seen. 
As is probably evident to the reader, the answers to such 
basic questions surrounding the subject of public participation in 
planning, are unlikely to be simple or simply elucidated. But the 
issues involved, even though there would seem to be little concurrence 
even as regards precisely what they are, are important and require 
answers. The pursuit of the answers pivots on the question that is 
at the heart of this study: what is the appropriate role for public 
participation in planning? 
- .. ",',. 
30 
2. PERSPECTIVES FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The terms 'public participation' or 'citizen participation' are 
modern. The essential idea (or is it ideas?) of the concept and the 
central issues involved, (and invariably raised), date at least to the 
times of Herodotus and Aristotle. The 'essence' of the concept is central 
to debates of 'wise government' that have concerned philosophers for 
millenia. Central issues include such as the essential meaning of democracy 
and relative virtues of egalitarianism and elitism. The pertinence of 
the concept of public participation to such fundamental issues of govern-
ment and public affairs is prbbably apparent to the reader. The fact of 
the'centrality of the concept to such issues, and elucidation of the 
relationship between different possible positions and conceptions held 
in regard to such issues and their implications in terms of prescribed 
meaning and imputed roles for 'public participation', will become 
apparent later in this chapter when several groups of theories of democracy 
are outlined. 
Public participation then, is a political concept. Like most 
social concepts, it intrinsically has meaning that is value-dependent: 
that is,the 'essence' of the concept is value-laden. The meaning of 
thi~ is that such as the definition, perception, discussion or interpreta-
tion of the concept is permeated necessarily by value positions in the 
form of such as attitudes, preconceptions, premises and assumptions. 
In this chapter it is contended that there are fundamental and 
widespread problems with both the literature and practice concerning public 
participation in planning that contribute significantly to the situation 
wherein there is a poor, confused basis for the elucidation of an. 
appropriate rol,e for public participation in planning, the goal of this 
. -.' -... -. . ~,' 
study. The problem can frequently be related to failures to explicate 
and/or, seemingly to appreciate the existence and/or significance of 
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the value bases of word and action necessarily involved in, respectively, 
the literature and practice pertaining to public participation in 
planning. 
This situation determines the emphasis of the remiander of this 
study. It is contended that the clarification of the 'essence' of public 
participation is an essential pr~requisite to the sufficient identifica-
tion, and thus discussion, of basic issues involved. This in turn is a 
prerequisite to the possible consideration of what might be an appropriate 
role for public participation in planning. 
It is considered that the amelioration of the situation whereby, 
in effect, public participation in planning often lacks due philosophic 
context is best facilitated by a portrayal of the range of value-dependent 
meaning contained in the concept when considered in the context of planning. 
In the latter part of this chapter a little-discussed paper is 
partially reported on and a framework based on it adopted which allows a 
portrayal of the range of value-dependent meaning. The framework utilises 
a major dichotomy in sociological theorizing concerning social order and 
permits the elucidation of such as the attitudes, preconceptions and 
assumptions pertaining to a wide range of possible perspectives by which 
public participation in planning can be regarded. This provides a 
suitable basis for consideration of the appropriateness of'particular 
perspectives concerning the role of public participation in planning, 
along with the consideration of important assumptive bases contained 
within these perspectives. These latter tasks are pursued in Chapter 3. 
From the above outline it will be apparent that the remainder 
of the study will be dominated by a certain 'philosophic' emphasis. No 
apology is tendered for this. Indeed I consider it a major irony that so 
much attention has been given to such as the methodology, efficacy, 
implications, evaluation and variously, advocacy and rejection of public 
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part.i cipati on in pl anning, when underlyi ng assumptive bases 'and meani ngs 
have been unattended both generally and regarding particular commentaries 
and experiences. As is indicated below, the lack of attention to the 
'philosophic' underpinnings comprises the central element on which rests 
the contention that there is a poor, confused basis for the elucidation 
of the goal of this study. 
2~2 THE PHILOSOPHIC VACUUM 
- Assertions of particularly-construed inadequacies in the literature 
on the subject of public participation in planning are not uncommon. 
Kasperson (1974:1) has observed that discussion concerning public partici-
pation in public affairs has "retreated from the great issues of value". 
Wengert (1976:24) in th~ crintext of cohsidering the explanation for the 
lack of normative or empirical theories applicable to the topic, considers 
that "much of the literature ... has dealt with the subject of participa-
tion as though it had never before been the subject of intellectual 
attention and as though it bore little relationship to earlier streams 
of political thought and analysis ... ". He' further complains that "much 
of the literature ... has tended to be prescriptive and hortatory, abound-
ing with rhetoric and polemics and resting on unanalyzed premises and 
assumptions" (loc cit). 
Such comments can be seen to be in lament of perceived absence 
of concern with placing the subject of public participation in planning 
in due philosophic context. Public participation is a value-laden 
concept; it has, a variable 'ess_ence'. There are choices to be made 
before its role in relation to any co~textual subject or social institution 
can be elucidated. 
Evidence that the choices have been addressed and made could be 
considered to be indicated by the existence of clear and explicit guide-
lines for practice. These might take the form of such as ethical or 
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.philosophical statements of purpose, principles for practice, or, at a 
lower level, policy and goal statements. (Integration of such conclusions 
with theoretical development could be considered to be indicated by the 
expounding, and relating of such as philosophic conclusions and principles 
in the context of normative planning theory.) 
The first indication and component of what has been contended 
is a poor, confused basis for the· elucidation of the role of public 
. participation in planning is simply the paucity of such philosophic 
conclusions and guidelines at all levels of planning practice. This 
situation is but the manifestation of underlying confusions and inadequacies 
concerning the consideration of the subject generally and it is thus on 
this underlying situation that attention must concentrate. However, the 
extent and something of the nature of the problem is revealed by a brief 
consideration of this 'philosophic vacuum' in relation to practice. 
There is a broad and growing range of arrangements and techniques 
relating to planning that constitute mechanisms for public participation. 
(See, for example Ryan, 1979:app. B, 66.) The planning literature is full 
of accounts documenting the introduction or experimentation with such 
mechanisms. (See, for example, People and Planning, March 1980: various; 
Sadler (ed), 1979: particularly Vol.2; various:) Meanwhile, existing 
procedures are being seemingly constantly revised and reformed. (See, 
for example, Gresham and Crothers (eds), 1979:1-2; Heberlein, 1976.) 
Their justification rests on lofty but often inexplicit and unexplained 
premises, such as that it is important to give the public more voice and 
it is important that the debate surrounding planning decisions be wide 
and open, perhaps so that greater 'efficiency' will prevail. 
As is frequently pointed out, it is regrettably usually the case 
that the precise purpose and function of particular exercises and 
techniques of involvement are left unclear. It is the norm for partici-
pants and everyone else to have little idea of the precise relationship 
between the participation and the outcome. Ideas of increased induced 
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a·ccountability mingle uneasily and often, it is to be noted, incompatibly, 
with ideas such as that the participation might have a more direct 
influence on the outcome. The doubt and uncertainty are functions and 
reflections of the lack of 'philosophical' clarity. Or more bluntly, no 
one is quite sure what is supposed to be the precise function, because 
this is not explicitly indicated. 
The uncertainty concerning either specific participation 
mechanisms or participation generally is revealed in discussion concerning 
practice. For example, New Zealand's largest symposium to date on "Public 
Involvement in Environmental Planning" reveals a large range of opinion 
concerning, and particularly criteria for the evaluation of, public 
participation, that exists in the planning community (Gresham and Crothers 
(eds.), 1979). Such documents incorporate the fruits of what Kasperson 
(1974:1) has described as lithe genuflection to the altar of citizen 
participation". There is an illusion of a unity of concern as all respect 
its generally-suspected, but unclear, importance. The diversity of 
philosophic positions however is obvious, ranging from conceptions that 
participation is simply a means (for example, Young, 1979:11-12) to 
conceptions that it is an end in itself, fundamental in the exercise of 
democracy and involving major structural alterations in existing relations 
of power (for example, Debnam, 1979:35-44). Clearly, in this diversity 
are major and fundamental differences of position, yet the debate seems 
hardly to get off the ground, seemingly smothered by the reverence-
inspired consideration that there must be 'more of it'. 
The 'philosophic vacuum' further manifests itself in what can only 
be described as a remarkable inconsistency of provision for public participa-
tion both within and between various New Zealand statutes relevant to 
resource management and planning, as has recently been demonstrated by 
Robertson (1979:30-33). When one searches for statutory statements of 
purpose reflecting positions of principle concerning public participation 
one draws a blank. Although, of course, all New Zealand planning arrange-
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ments include components which can be considered forms of participation, 
the concept is ne~er explicitly referred to or prescribed in the pertaining 
statutes, nor is there clear indication of what might be its precise 
purpose. 
Judging from some major statutory excursions overseas concerning 
public participation, perhaps we should be grateful. The philosophic 
confusion incorporated in such as the United States Economic Opportunity 
Act, 1964 (antipoverty legislation), which required "maximum'feasible 
participation",and urban renewal legislation (The Demonstration Cities 
and Metropolitan Development Act, 1966), which required "widespread 
citizen participation", has been deafening. (See, for example, Kasperson 
and Breitbart (eds), 1974.) 
Similarly, considerable confusion has accompanied the statutory 
requirement in the British Town and Country Planning Act (1968) that local 
authorities should undertake planning particpation exercises. Again, the 
Skeffington Report, commissioned by the British Government specifically 
to enlighten the planners and public (and perhaps the politicians) on 
, 
how the 1968 Act requirements could be met, has seemingly done 1 ittle to 
reduce the confusion. (See Damer and Hague, 1971; Thornley, 1977; 
Hampton, 1977.~, Recent indications that central government will request 
local authorities to state the objectives of their structure planning 
participation programmes and formulate 'achievement criteria ' has turned 
confusion to panic (Boaden et al, 1980:98). 
The common experience internationally seems to have been that 
'public participation ' has been prescribed, with little accompanying 
indication of what its precise function should be. 
The field of evaluation and assessment of public participation 
exercises and techniques also reveals considerable confusion in overseas 
experience. This aspect of experience is poignant simply because 
evaluation must be based on conceptions of the purpose of the activity. 
Sewell and Phillips (1979) have recently reviewed twenty-two North American 
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.evaluative studies. In addition to revealing unsurprising variation 
within experiences of purposes as perceived by different parties, the 
studies reveal a considerable range of conceptions of purpose among 
experiences, as perceived by similar parties, inclusive of planning 
agencies. 
Furthermore, Sewell and Phillip's consideration of several 
suggested models for evaluation has revealed that some such models are 
biased towards agency and key actor perceptions of objectives and take 
little account of such as citizenry satisfaction. The subject of 
evaluation has focussed debate concerning the purpose of public participa-
tion in planning particularly in Britain; this is the subject of 
attention later in this section. 
A brief examination of some of the confusions and inadequacies 
in the literature concerning the consideration of the subject might elicit 
some of the contributing sources of this philosophic vacuum which confuses 
the practice. 
That the literature concerning public participation in planning 
has also not cgped very well with basic philosphic questions is perhaps 
firstly indicated by the lack of both theoretical treatment and the 
integration of such development with normative planning theory. This has 
r 
been the subject of concern of various writers. (See, for example, 
Wengert, 1976.) 
Other recent concern and debate which centrally does not focus 
on the subject of public participation, but is, nevertheless, of key 
importance to the confusion in the accommodation of the subject, concerns 
general planning theory, and the sense in which it and planning is 
problematic in regard to the subject of public participation in planning. 
Much orthodox planning theory and practice rests on a 'rational I 
model (see Faludi, 1973:various). The model fosters and is based on 
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i.deas that the rationality of planning is distinct from political 
rationality and, related to this, that planning is essentially apolitical 
and amoral. Recently, a growing debate has developed which revolves 
around such basic issues as 'what kind of activity is planning' and 
'what do planners do'? This debate is laying the foundations for 
the possible emergence of new planning theories that will fundamentallx 
oppose the above-related ideas. (See, for example, Bolan, 1980; 
Forester, 1980.) 
For the issue of public participation, it being an essentially 
political idea, this debate is of fundamental importance. It is logical 
that if one considers that planning is essentially apolitical and amoral, 
then the philosophic vacuum is not centrally 'planning's problem'. 
The sustainability and appropriateness of various pertaining 
planning theoretical positions ~re discussed in Chapter 3. What is of 
concern here is that in the discussion (and confusion) concerning public 
participation in planning there are involved different conceptions of 
planning, which not only may yield different possible theoretical bases 
for the accommodation of the subject, but which may question the very 
need for any normative theoretical basis to be provided. 
Awareness_of this problematic nature of planning in attempts to 
identify the role of public participation in planning, or in writing which 
. implies significance or role, ~ould appear to be vital. Ones conception 
of the essence of planning constitutes part of the value position upon 
which such as ones consideration of the meaning and significance of public 
participation rests. Yet in much of the literature concerning public 
participation in planning, such awareness would appear to be poor. 
Although not very constructive, the point must be substantiated. 
Fagence (1977:Chapter 3), as part of a voluminous exploration of "Citizen 
Participation in Planning", reviews a wide variety of models of the 
planning and decision-making process. In these models is a valuable 
range of conceptions concerning the functions which public participation 
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has been considered to be involved in, pitted against the functions that 
planning has been considered to be involved in. The models comprise, 
therefore, images of perceived interrelationships b~tween the two 
principal problematic subjects concerning public participation in planning. 
Yet Fagence does not relate to the variation in planning models as 
being problematic. 
Another example concerns Connor's (1976) "Constructive Citizen 
Participation - A Model ", presented below: 
Figure 2.1 
Public partlclpalion In the planning process 
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(after Connor, 1976:76) 
Connor's approach is of concern here. As the text accompanying the diagram 
reveals, Connor does not consider that there is anything problematic 
concerning his model of the planning process (which, to be noted, includes 
"decision by representatives") when juxtaposed to the notion of the public 
participation process. Yet Connor's model contains a not untypical major 
assumption that decision-making is finally the province of representatives, 
despite the curious "decision" that the public comes to. A central debate 
concerning the meaning of participatory decision-making is thus largely 
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p~ecluded by the approach, yet this is not acknowledged. (See Cook and 
Morgan (eds), 1971:various; Pateman, 1970; Pranger, 1968.) 
The problem with the failure to have awareness of, and give 
recognition to, such as the problematic nature of planning is that, in 
this failure, unexplicated assumptions and preconceptions are introduced. 
These assumptive bases preclude the accommodation of at least some of the 
numerous political and ideological interpretatipns of public participation, 
thus circumscribing the consideration of the essence of public participa-
tion, and/or the role it may play in planning. 
Important and immediately identifiable 'victims ' of such 
circumscription wherein assumptions concerning planning are unexplicated, 
~re those elements of conceptions of public participation that are 
questioning of the particular conception of planning involved. 
A quick glance through the literature pertaining to 'failed ' 
planning projects concerning such as motorways, airports and urban 
r 
renewal projects remind that there are numerous suth elements. (See, 
for example, Wilkinson, 1976; Mutch, 1977; Thomson, 1977; Wood, 1976.) 
It is important to note that many of these considerations of the essence 
and purpose .of participation and many of the demands for its greater 
inclusion in planning are not merely challenging the substantive content 
. 
and results, but also the planning and/or decision-making organisation 
and process involved and the underlying precepts of action. Here we see 
the likelihood that the inclusion of unexplicated assumptions will ignore 
or overlook the fact that many conceptions of public participation and 
issues raised are questioning planning's role in society or other aspects 
of planning as a social institution. 
It is apparent from the argument thus far, that to give due 
consideration to the role of public participation in planning one must be 
aware of, recognise and ideally explicate the assumptive bases by which 
ones investigation proceeds, for these assumptive bases circumscribe the 
consideration of the essence of the con~ept. It is on the contention that 
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these crucial assumptive bases often seem not to have been considered, 
let alone addressed and explicated, that I base my assertion that the 
literature provides a poor and confused basis for the elucidation of the 
role of public participation in planning. 
These failures relate not only to considerations of the nature 
of planning but also more generally. Similarly, the negative results 
of these failures are often not simply confined to 'undeclared' 
circumscription of the consideration of the essence of the concept 
(as illustrated above), but also often contribute to confusion and 
inconsistency. To illustrate these points we can return to Fagence's 
book and consider his general approach. 
Any author aiming to make comments concerning such as the 
significance, importance or role of public participation in planning must 
adopt value positions whether wittingly or unwittingly. In Fagence's 
approach (Fagence, 1977), which is not untypical in its undeliberate 
style, these have been introduced predominantly in conceptions and 
considerations that he has adopted and/or accepted. For example, 
Fagence accepts Burns's consideration that "participation is an addition 
to, not a substitute for, professional planning" (op cit:122). Also he 
accepts Skeffington's conception concerning a possible decision-making 
.' 
role, when he adopts Skeffington's (ostensibly) pragmatic (sic) stance, 
saying "there is a point beyond which lay involvement cannot proceed, 
if only because a moment is reached at which the consultation and 
deliberation must stop and a decision made" (op cit:12). 
Such adoptions are often contradictory to yet other adoptions: 
for example, Fagence's acceptnace of Godschalk's conception of public 
participation as a "decision-forming partnership" (op cit:4) and his 
acceptance of the consideration that participation is about the equalisa-
tion of power (op cit:11), are antagonistic to several other adoptions, 
including the above-mentioned stances of BUrns and Skeffington. 
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The result of this somewhat casual adoption of partially 
contradictory essence-bounding notions is confusion concerning what 
Fagence considers to be the essence of public participation. His failure 
to offer definitions of key terms (see op cit:13), another characteristic 
of the literature generally, further compounds the uncertainty about what 
is being referred to. 
In Fagence's case, at least, perhaps part of the explanation for 
-the confusion can be attributed to the incorporation of proclaimed 
"pragmatism" (op cit:12) which, as I see it, denies any significance to 
matters of principle in the nature of the toncept for its consideration 
in regard to planning. It is interesting to contemplate that Fagence, 
while pronouncing his prag~atism, in the same sentence claims to have 
an ideological position concerning public participation in planning 
(loccit) . 
Given what is considered to be the wide~pread failure to recognise 
the significance of and address and explicate the crucial assumptive bases 
which give meaning to the essence of public participation, it is not 
surprising that much of the literature concerns allegations that another 
I 
writer or 'practitioner' has failed to identify a 'reality' or 'due 
significance'~ An example is Kasperson's rebuttal of those suggesting 
the impracticality of participation on the grounds of empirically-
established apathy, with the consideration that low participation levels 
are simply the inevitable result of depoliticization of those on lithe 
periphery" whose interests are often the subject of public participation 
demands (Kasperson, 1974:2). 
Such dialogue occupies much of the literature and represents the 
intellectual search for answers to such as the importance of public 
participation in planning. However, the absence of progress towards 
conclusions means that such continuing debate does not substantially 
assist in the effort to find a basis whereby the role of public participa-
tion in planning may be elucidated. 
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Neither does the writing of those who have attempted to come to 
conclusions about the subject in a piecemeal manner (for example, 
White, 1982). 
Similarly, the pursuit of the identification of what are 
considered to be the 'crucial issues' does not substantially assist - it 
is inevitable that there is little agreement of what these might be. 
'Suggestions' include representation (Fagenc~, 1977:69), control 
(Bailey, 1975:39) and egalitarianism (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976:16). 
Wengert convinces as regards the unlikelihood that this approach will 
bear fruit: he contempl ates "perhaps the issues are ... issues of 
controlling government, assuring sound and wise decisions, providing 
for due process, protecting minority views, establishing responsibility 
and responsiveness, seeking equity and striving for the publ ic interest"! 
(Wengert, 1976:39). 
Again, those who have focussed on the identification, formulatidn 
and pursuit of 'critical questions" (for example, Wengert, 1971; Sewell 
and Coppock, 1977:7-11) do not substantially assist. 
What is generally lacking in the continuing dialogue and 
intellectual endeavour, it is suggested, is a perspective of the range 
of the imputed meanings and the corresponding value positions: an over-
view which relates to the dimensions by which the essence of the subject 
varies, and thus viewpoints concerning how its significance and role 
vary. As indicated earlier, the pursuit of the identification of such 
is considered to hold the best promise of amelioration of what constitutes, 
it has been contended, a poor basis for the elucidation of the role of 
public participation in planning. 
There have been several writers who have reviewed various aspects 
of the literature with an orientation to identifying and ordering the 
different pertaining perspectives and their underlying normative bases. 
May (1971) has reviewed a large range of studies employing the four 
Parsonian categories of socialization, integration, adaption and goal-
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. attainment to categorise perceived goals inherent in the respective 
analyses. Her approach yields findings that are commensurate with the 
framework later adopted. These are in brief that analysts who pursue 
socialization or integration value political stability, those who focus 
upon adaption value political rationality and those who focus upon 
goal-attainment value political conflict. Lowenstein (1971) presents 
a simpler categorisation of a smaller range of studies. 
Most reviews of the literature, however, have not ordered the 
pertaining perspectives or the bases of analysis. Some (for example, 
Spiegel and Mittenthal, 1968) are content to simply record the argument 
and/or position taken, often in the context of contrasting stances, 
without systematically identifying or characterising the pertaining 
normative base. 
Kasperson (1974:Chapter 1), in the context of an impressive 
pursuit of the essence of the word 'participation', identifies a range 
of types of distinctions, each type involving numerous variations, some 
of which he indicates along with respective emphases and 'blinders'. 
Kasperson's article alerts the reader to the diversity, complexity and 
incompatibility of relevant dimensions which might contribute to the 
delineation of the meaning of participation. The idea of being able to 
logically order all meanings suddenly is seen to be an impossibility, 
if it ever wasn't. 
Kasperson's article reveals the relevance of a rangeof1dimensions 
inclusive of incorporated images of society, modes of analysis, conceptions 
of human nature and a diversity of values inclusive of those pertaining 
to political arrangements. Other articles stand to confirm the relevance 
of the particular dimensions outlined above. The identification of the 
dimensions as problematic is often prompted by various previous articles 
or actions that have involved a particular stance that the later commentator 
is questioning. For example, and of particular interest given the basis 
of the framework to be adopted, are those who have questioned the consensus 
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4mage of society that other authors have adopted. (For example, Boaden 
et al's (1980:16) critical comments of Smith's attempt to treat the 
subject of public participation in planning theoretically.) (See also 
Smith, 1973.) 
Other articles indicate that yet other dimensions are relevant. 
For example, Friedmann (1973:4), in the context of a forum article 
concerning the philosophy of public affairs, suggests images of man are 
pertinent in his condemnation of the "predominant" utilitarian view that 
he considers planners hold. 
2.3 PERSPECTIVES FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING: A FRAMEWORK 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In the remainder of this chapter an article is partially 
, , 
reported on, which stands alone in the literature for its attempt to 
identify and order the range of value-based positions that might be held 
concerning public participation in planning. The article is by Andrew 
Thornley (1977) and is entitled "Theoretical Perspectives on Planning 
Participation". 
Thornley's paper was motivated by perceived contradictions 
concerning planning that arose consequent to the passing of the Town 
and Country Planning Act (1968) and the Skeffington Report, both of which 
acted as major stimuli to participa~ion in Britain. His concern is 
centrally with establishing a basis for the evaluation of participation 
techniques and his thesis is that before such assessment can occur "it 
is necessary to have a clear conception of the role and purpose of 
participation itself" (Thornley, 1977:3). 
Thornley develops a framework which enables the identification 
and exploration of a series of perspectives, each corresponding to different 
value-based positions pertaining to the role of public participation 
in planning. 
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This framework is useful for exploring the goal of this study, 
the role of public participation in planning, for several reasons. 
Firstly, the framework appears to meet the claim of Thornley that all 
approaches and views on public participation can be related to the range 
of perspectives accommodated in it - that is, the range of what is 
problematic concerning public participation is accommodated. Secondly, 
" and similarly, the framework seems to accommodate the range of what can 
be considered problematic concerning the nature of planning and its role 
in society. Thirdly, the framework allows a wide range of key assumptions 
to be identified within each perspective. Fourthly, the framework allows 
for implicit views of, and implications for, relevant issues to be 
identified within each perspective, and assists in the explication of 
these issues. 
The framework is partially based on two polar ideal-typical 
m'odels of social order. Social order has long been a central problem for 
sociologists. Indeed many sociologists would probably contend that it 
is the central problem. (See, for example, Cohen, 1968:Chapter 2.) 
Fundamentally, the two models of social order can be considered as 
extremes on a continuum of sociological theories. 
The two models have been described by Dahrendorf (1959:159) as 
the IItwo faces ... {of society)lI. These 'faces I vary basically in the 
emphasis they give as to the relative importance of conflict or consensus 
in society. As Dahrendorf iterates, consensus theory, which he calls 
integration theory, IIconceives of social structure in terms of a 
functionally integrated system hel~ in equilibrium by certain patterned 
and recur'rent processes II (loc cit). On the other hand, conflict theory 
which Dahrendorf calls coercion theory, IIviews social structure as a form 
of organisation held together by force and constraint and reaching 
continuously beyond itself in the sense of producing within itself the 
forces that maintain it in an unending process of change ll (loc cit). 
{It should be noted here that the terms consensus and conflict will be 
r 
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'used from now on, these usages being most common.) 
The significance of the dual models is profound and far-reaching 
as Bailey (1975:Chapter 5) suggests and Horton (1966:705-706) explicates; 
the adoption of one view rather than another brings with it distinctive 
images of man and society, human nature, values, bounded definitions for 
social problems in addition to indicating particular modes of 'scientific' 
analysis. Here we see the accommodation of a considerable range of 
dimensions identified as pertinent in the last section. 
Before outlining these theoretical visions of society further 
it should be established that al~hough the theories are essentially 
mutually exclusive, both can co-exist in an explanation of society. 
Indeed, Oahrendorf, lamenting the domination in sociological thinking 
of consensus theoryat the time of writing, suggests that "in sociology 
(as opposed to philosophy) a decision that accepts one of these theories 
and rejects the other is neither necessary nor desirable. There are 
sociological problems for the explanation of which the integration theory 
of society provides adequate assumptions; there are other problems which 
can be explained only in terms of the coercion theory of society ... for 
sociological analysis, (and axiomatically I would suggest therefore for 
planning and decision-making analysis), society is Janus headed, and its 
two faces are equivalent aspects of the same reality" (Oahrendorf, 1959: 
159). Thus Oahrendorf states later that "neither of these models can 
be conceived as exclusively valid or applicable", and that "whatever 
criticism one may have of the advocates of one or other of these models 
can therefore be directed only against claims for the exclusive validity 
of either" (op cit:163). 
Below is a brief outline of the contrasting, mutually exclusive 
models. 
, 
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Consensus theories of society, like all systems theories, 
stress the interrelatedness between component parts. Hence the theories 
seek out and dwell on those factors of societal action which illustrate. 
tendencies to unity and interdependence. Hence culture is perceived of 
as something shared, and values and moral standards as the subject of 
agreement; these characteristics are presumably the key to omnipotent 
stability. Change is conceived of as a consequence of disturbance to 
the equilibrium condition under which the societal system normally 
functions. Howeve~, such a disturbance is not transforming of the basic 
system - the common culture and values ensure societal members have a 
similar interpretation of any event or situation: this provides the 
basis for control processes that are conceived of as "bring(ing) the 
system back into adjustment" (Thornley, 1977:6). Order is seen as both 
a functional characteristic and a necessity, and systems theory tends 
t'o discount divergence of either opinion or action, tending to consider 
them as 'unsystematic ' phenomena, the product of individual, rather 
than societal, perturbation. 
Conflict theory sees society essentially in terms of a 
"continually contested struggle between groups with opposing goals and 
world views" (Thornley, 1977:6). Conflict, for reasons variously 
explained but generally stressing such as diversity of values and 
standards, is seen as endemic in society. It is also seen as a necessary 
condition of social change, a phenomenon which is explained in social 
structural terms rather than in terms of individual personality·. Social 
order cannot be the product of social or cultural integration, but 
rather is imposed by some form of social organisation, for example, a 
dominant class. 'Equilibrium' cannot last; while change can be 
arrested and stabil'ity can exist temporarily, this can only be at the 
expense of growing tension and eventual increased violence at the next 
stage of social change. 
i 
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Dahrendorf (1959:161-162) has summarised the assumptions 
inherent in these two types of theory: 
Consensus Confl ict 
(l) Every society is a relatively (1) Every society is at every point 
persistant, stable structure subject to processes of change; 
of elements. social change is ubiquitous. 
(2) Every society is a well- ( 2) Every society displays at every 
integrated structure of point dissensus and conflict; 
elements. social conflict is ubiquitous. 
( 3) Every element in a society (3) Every element in a society 
has a function i.e. renders re~ders a contribution to its 
a contribution to its disintegration and change. 
maintenance as a system. 
(4) Every functioning social (4) Every society is based on the 
structure is based on a coercion of some of its members 
consensus of values among by others. 
its members. 
2,.3.2 The Framework 
2.3.2.1 The Basis: the Social Order Dimension 
Thornley's framework consists of the juxtaposition of two scales 
or continuums. One accommodates the range of theories of social order; 
the other the degree of participation. The framework is illustrated 
below: 
Figure 2.2 
Degree of 
social 
change 
High 
Low 
Low High 
Degree of participation 
(adapted from Thornley, 1977:8) 
Thornley, in establishing the horizontal axis, defines participation 
as lithe involvement in societal decision-making" (Thornley, 1977:8) 
and, at least initially, is concerned with extent of participation; 
the continuum, however, can also be considered to have a qualitative 
dimension perceived, necessarily, subjectively. 
Thornley selects three theorists of social order, namely 
M~rx, a conflict theorist. Almond and Verba, consensus theorists, and 
Dahrendorf, representing a middle position. In a content analysis of 
major writings of these authors he derives their respective views 
concerning participation in relation to their theoretical position 
concerning social order. His findings are represented below: 
Figure 2.3 
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change 
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(adapted from Thornley, 1977:20) 
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Elaboration of this analysis and the respective views of participation 
and social order is called for as this forms the basis of the framework. 
It is, however, essentially truncated. 
Marx 
Ignoring early works of Marx analysed, Marx's attitude to 
participation derived from his concern with the class struggle 'and he 
emphasised the dynamic elements of nineteenth century society. He 
perceived unresolvable clashes of interest in society that created a 
......... , 
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.need for structural change. Participation was an inherent aspect of 
class struggle which raised consciousness and had an educational value. 
Participation occurred in relation to the organisation of class 
interests, to communes with decentralised decision-making powers and to 
mandated delegates. 
Marx was concerned with analysing social change which he saw 
as developing in an antagonistic class struggle between proletariat and 
bourgeoisie. The 'end' of this struggle depended upon the proletariat 
increasing their consciousness as an essential ingredient for the 
process of revolution by which change occurred. In this sense all 
citizens 'participated', although it is clear that Marx did not think 
direct participation in ~uch as decision-making was possible. (Mandated 
delegates fulfilled such roles.) 
Al~ond and Verba 
Almond and Verba are concerned with the political 'subsystem' 
in their analysis which is based explicitly on the structural functional 
framework of Parsons. Thus, Almond and Verba's work emphasises consensus 
attitudes to stability and change in society. As Thornley says lithe 
approach can be described as one which attempts to explain the social 
phenomena in terms of the parts they play in the existence and survival 
of a wider society'" (op cit:13). 
The focus of attention is on how the 'dynamic equilibrium' is 
maintained. Change occurs in cyclical adjustments to the system, thus 
both avoiding the need for, and by definition, the possibility of, 
revolutionary or structural changes. Such handling of social change 
is dependent on value-consensus existing in "some higher, overarching 
attitudes of solidarity, whether these attitudes be the norms associated 
with the 'rules of the democratic game' or the belief that there exists 
within the society a supraparty solidarity based on non-partisan 
criteria" (Almond and Verba, 1965:492). 
I . 
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Thornley writes, "interest in politics is ... kept to a limited 
level and conflicts dealt with through adaption; Personal interest in 
politics and any conflicts that arise are kept within the bounds set up 
by the general attitudes. This general level 'manages' differences of 
opinion by creating cohesion through agreement on these 'more important' 
values. Political culture is used to describe that aspect of the 
general value-consensus that refers to attitudes to the political 
system". He adds "Almond and Verba are seeking the ideal political 
culture to maintain democratic stability" (Thornley, 1977:14). 
The political culture they are proposing they call 'the civic 
culture' which is a composite of three elements - the 'parochial 
culture', the 'subject culture' and the 'participant culture'. In the 
first, ignorance precludes even any attitude to politics. In the second 
citizens are knowledgeable but ~assive. In the last an expectation exists 
that it is possible to playa part in political activities. Participa-
tion thus, is important to "maintain ... governmental power and 
governmental responsiveness ... (and) ... maintain other balances that 
derive from the power-responsiveness balance" (Almond & Verba, 1965:476). 
Participation, however, is necessarily limited - it is only one element 
in the balanced 'civic culture'. The implication is that it would be 
.' 
undesirable if too many people participated. 
The belief that people could participate is what is important. 
Almond and Verba write "if decision-makers believe that the ordinary 
man could participate ... they are likely to behave quite differently 
than if such a belief did not exist. Even if individuals do not act 
according to this belief decision-makers may act orr the assumption that 
they can, and in this way be more responsive to the citizenry than they 
would if the myth of participation did not exist" (Almond & Verba, 
1965:183). As Thornley iterates "participation has to remain QS a myth 
because of the impossibility of organising participation in reality". 
While only a belief in the myth of participation is needed, "if it were 
attempted to change the myth for reality, then this would upset the 
system" (Thornley, 1977:16). 
As extended participation is impossible, Almond and Verba 
conclude that lithe maintenance of elite power is essential in a 
democracy" (Almond & Verba, 1965:490). The structural-functional 
logic is apparent in the following: lithe comparative infrequency of 
political participation, its relative lack of importance for the 
,individual and the objective weakness of the ordinary man allow 
government's elites to act. The inactivity of the ordinary man and 
his inability to influence decisions help provide the power that 
governmental elites need if they are to make decisions" (op cit:481). 
Dahrendorf 
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Dahrendorf, in his' "Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial 
( 
Society", not only accepts that there is conflict in society, but sees 
it as a hallmark of a healthy society. He thus insists that it is, 
and is concerned with how it can be, managed. He outlines three forms 
of regulation - namely conciliation, mediation and arbitration - which 
are the basis of the management of confl ict. 
Participation's role lies in its contribution to these processes. 
This requires interests being organised into identifiable grQups. The 
implied possibility and effectiven~ss of such organisation for the 
management of conflict is reminiscent of pluralist theories of democracy 
which stress that the governmental elite is partly constituted by 
representatives of interest groups. Dahrendorf sees this, along with the 
regulatory mechanisms outlined by which groups can influence all parts 
of the governmental elite, as ensuring the responsiveness of the elite 
to society. As Thornley relates (1977:19), Dahrendorf placed more faith 
in elitist decision-making (and thus less on participation) in his later 
writing. (This explains why he is given two positions in respect to 
degree of participation - see Figure 2.3.) 
. -.- .. ~.-:.' ,- - ~ 
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. 2.3.2.2 The Democratic Theory Dimension 
Thornley dis~usses various theories of democracy which he 
eventually places in the framework. This is to "give more substance to 
the framework (and thus) the application of theoretical perspectives to 
participation in planning" (op cit:23). 
However, Thornley's accommodation of the democratic theory 
debate is of more fundamental importance than the somewhat incidental 
contribution suggested. Thornley's treatment of the debate concerning 
democratic theory is of fundamental importance to the consideration of 
the role of~ublic participation in planning in that it enables 
perspectives and op.inions concerning 'participatory planning', which may 
not be concerned to establish political implications or positions, to 
be related to these theories. This is so because it identifies through 
the medium of the framework that there is a certain coincidence in the 
( 
assumptions of particular theories of social order and particular groups 
of theories nf democracy. In other words, to a certain extent, different 
theories of democracy rest on different conceptions of social order. 
Thus the treatment enables the assumptions concerning democracy 
to be generally related to differing conceptions of social order. This 
also enables differing implications for the role of participation to be 
more readily identified. 
Thornley identifies two principal categories of theorists, the 
modern democratic theorists and the participatory democrats. Theorists 
of participatory democracy can be seen as having contributed greatly, 
in the last twenty years, to promotion of the idea of greater participa-
tion both in planning and other activity. The modern democrats represent, 
arguably, the "mainstream" democratic theory thought in post-war Western 
world. 
::;::::~:} .. <:~:.: 
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Thornley relates both the theories of modern democracy and of 
participatory democracy to those of the age-old classical theorists. 
He depicts the modern democrats, founded by such writers as Schumpeter, 
as essentially confronting the preceding conspicuously-normative 
classicist theorists in order to cope with the realities of contemporary 
society. The new thrust was on constructing supposedly value-free and 
empirically-based theories. These are the theories of Irealpolitikl. 
The theorists of participatory democracy are depicted as commonly reacting 
to the conservative bias of the modern democrats, and in their attack 
and formulation of their theories they return to the participatory 
principles of the classicists, although their view of social order is 
generally quite different. 
The classicists, as was suggested above, represent a long 
tradltion from Greek origins'. While there is considerable diversity, 
a'~entral principle of popular sovereignty is common. (See Pennock, 
1979.) This typically leads to a considerable stress on concepts of 
participation in public affairs. Rousseau, for example, considered it 
possible and beneficial to develop eaEh individual IS potential so that 
he or she learns to become a public as well as a private citizen. Public 
institutions are essentially participatory ones which allow for the full 
education and self-development of individuals so that the citizen is 
psychologically and presumably educationally capable to appreciate and 
exercise what is best for society, which is incorporated in the social 
contract, which is both the statement and creator of a harmonious and 
integrated community. 
Thornley identifies three functions of participation as Rousseau 
sees it: firstly ... Ithe individual increases control over the course 
of his/her life and environment, it'enables collective decisions to be 
made more easily accepted by the individual, and thirdly it. has an 
integrative function in increasing the individualls feeling of belonging 
to a community II (Thornley, 1977:23). 
I c,'." 
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In Thornley's framework, Rousseau is placed in the bottom 
right-hand corner (see Figure 2.4): he believes in the maximum 
participation of all citizens (given popular sovereignty) and conceives 
of an harmonious community. 
The Modern Democrats 
As mentioned above, the modern democrats are concerned to question 
the assumptions and tenability of propositions of the normative classical 
theories and present empirically~based theories which explain the realities 
of modern society. The approach is reflected in Schumpeter's reformulation: 
II ••• the democratic method (original emphasis) is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to d.ecide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people's vote ll (Schumpeter, 1943:269). 
The focus is on realities. Thus, a first question for these 
theorists is to try to explain how democracy can operate \'/hen uninterest 
in politics is high. Reflecting the tendency characteristic of function-
alist and other systems thinking to explain the consequent ·in terms of 
the premise, they conclude that apathy is in fact necessary for the 
stability of society. Thornley (1977:23) quotes Berelson II ••• we need 
some people who are active in a certain respect, others in the middle 
and still others passive ll • 
This conclusion leads to a central contention that due to the 
complexities of society a representative system of decision-making is 
required. It can be noted that this shifts the emphasis for evaluation 
of decisions (and democracy) from the people and the process to the out-
come. As Thornley notes, lithe success of decision-:-making is to be judged 
by the qual ity of the decisions made ll (loc cit). 
The role of the citizen is, generally, passive. 'As elites need 
to work out the complexities of issues the focus of modern democratic 
theory is on identifying the conditions whereby they can best do this. 
'."- ,'.~, . '-' ".'.-
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.Thus Thornley explains the need and tendency for theorists to stress 
democracy as the method "of ensuring the continued stability and 
equilibrium of the prevailing society" (op cit:24). Thus a consensus 
model is desirable, and adopted. Apathy is desirable in preserving 
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the balance of the system (and to enable the elite to get on with their 
work). An underlying value system is necessary. Socialization is 
perceived as the means by which value-consensus and hence stability 
and hence democracy is assured. It can be suggested that manipulation 
of society has a positive meaning for the defence of democracy. The 
role of participation to ensure accountability of the elite is frequently 
conceived of as being limited to elections. 
Thornley summarises the implications for participation in the 
reformulation of democracy to fit 'modern conditions I : "This (reformula-
tion) rejected the ideal of participation of everyone and substituted a 
r~~resentative system in which decision-making is allocated to a small 
elite. Participation is required to the extent that it makes this system 
work, i.e. through ensuring accountability of the elite. This is 
achieved through making the elite stand for re-election at regular 
intervals. The elite also must believe that some people have the ability 
and desire to participate if they think the results of decisions are not 
acceptable" (op cit:26). 
The position of the modern democrats is thus seen to be identical 
to Almond and Verbals (see Figure 2.4). They have rejected the partici-
patory ideal as impossible yet still conceive of, and desire, a harmonious, 
stable society. But this stability is achieved by considerably different 
means than Rotisseau envisaged. 
Theorists of Participatory Democracy 
As mentioned earlier, theorists of participatory democracy can 
be seen as reacting against the conservative bias of the modern democrats 
and, in this, represent a return to the participatory ideals of the 
, " 
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classicists. Their view differs from that of the classicists, however, 
in that in their rejection of the aim of maintaining the status quo they 
are advocating a higher degree of social change. Thornley (op cit:27), 
questions the degree to which participatory theorists are in fact 
advocating revolutionary change and whether they could be located at the 
top of his framework along with Marx. He points to the varying attitudes 
to social change that are held by these theorists. He says, "they are 
. not very explicit on h?w far they would go in supporting radical changes 
and one can only obtain hints ... to establish their views. Some may 
see status quo advocacy as detrimental simply because it does not allow 
the full development of the individual that can be obtained through 
participation. Others would suggest that a radical change in the social 
structure is needed to overcome ~vident social conflicts and as a pre-
requisite of meaningful participation" (op cit:28). 
Thus the position of the theorists of participatory democracy on 
the framework (see Figure 2.4) is in the high participation area,and on 
the 'degree of social change ' dimension, taking a path from the position 
of Rousseau towards (although not necessarily arriving at) that of Marx. 
Thornley concludes the formation of his theoretical framework 
as depicted in Figure 2.4 below, in which the positions of the theorists 
of social order are plotted together with the democratic theorists. The 
three shaded areas in the diagram represent three alternative perspectives 
which a~e the culmination of his work. Perspective One is represented 
by the viewpoint of Almond and Verba and the modern democratic theorists, 
Perspective Two by Marx and the somewhat extended ideas of the theorists 
of participatory democracy, and Perspective Three by (early) Dahrendorf. 
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2~3.3 Some Implications for Public Participation in Planning 
In the final section of his essay Thornley produces a synthesis 
of his work, focussing on the three perspectives. This includes comment 
relating to various techniques of public participation which would be 
appropriate to achieve particular goals within particular perspectives. 
These aspects are primarily concluding com~ents relating to the preceding 
analysis of the development of planning in Britain. These aspects 
need not be related here. 
His synthesis also involves a summary of the perspectives, 
inclusive of the central assumptions and an indication of their general 
implications for public participation in planning. These aspects are of 
central relevance for our purposes, but their iteration ~ere in full 
would involve considerable repetition concerning the perspectives and 
component key assumptions. Therefore the perceived implications for public 
participation are stressed and, although some repetition concerning the 
perspectives' makeup is unavoidable, these latter aspects are npt fully 
- ~,'_.-, 
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included: the following should therefore be considered in relation to 
earlier indication of their respective content. 
Perspective One: Consensus and Stability 
. From the viewpoint of this perspective, society is seen as a 
complex system within which stability is achieved through its adaptive 
response to the environment .. Adaptability is achieved through a process 
of 'dynamic equilibrium' whereby feedback is acquired from each part of 
the system. Thornley points to the importance of information in this 
feedback process, then to the role of public participation in providing 
this information, and the implication: he writes, "participation would 
be seen as a means of improving this information and hence the adapt-
ability of the social system" (op cit:43). He sees this role for partici-
pation prescribed in several British proposals. He notes that "participa-
tion is not seen as involvement by people in decision-making but as a 
two-way information exchange ... " (loc cit). Information flows one way 
when the public let the 'planner' know of its views (thereby providing 
a "much more comprehensive coverage") and flows the other way when the 
'planner' publishes his view. Thornley stresses that" ... the plan 
adapts to public attitudes but·is not formed by them" (op cit:44). 
Within this perspective the assumption of value-consensus is seen 
to have important implications for the role of public participation in 
planning. Thornley notes that "within the sub-system of planning this 
overriding value occurs in the notion of 'the public interest' and the 
role of participation in providing information "would be used to modify 
and adapt the composition of 'the public interest'. The more information 
obtained, the greater the legitimacy given to the concept and ~lans 
justified on the basis of it" (loc cit). The assumption of value-consensus 
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.incorporates the idea that people tend to have similar interpretations 
of a situation. Participation is seen as an aid to promoting this 
similar interpretation and thus as a tool for socializing people into 
the norms of society. Thornley notes that because of this IImethods 
of participation are to be preferred that are oriented towards the 
individual rather than methods that migh~ foster group solidarity 
against system-wide norms ll (loc cit). Mixed attitudes to participation 
are seen as desirable whereby some people remain apathetic towards or 
uninvolved in planning issues. 
From the viewpoint of this perspective emphasis is placed on 
allowing an elite to make decisions. Participation is seen as useful in 
ensuring the accountability of this elite and in improving the quality 
of information on which these decisions are made. 
The essential role of public participation from the viewpoint 
of' this perspective is summarised in the following: participation lIis 
seen as a means of improving communication, coordination and under-
standing. In this way people are integrated into an acceptance of the 
'rules of the game' and the system is provided with the feedback necessary 
for adaption and maintenance of equilibrium. Conflicts only result from 
personal misunderstanding. These can be overcome through participation 
that integrates people into the mainstream of social values" (op cit:45). 
Within this perspective further implications for the role of 
the planner extend from the implications for power relations. Power is 
seen as an lIattribute that accrues to certain positions of authority in 
society as a result of the commonly agreed value system a. resource 
used by the legitimised leadership to make decisions in the general 
interest of the whole communityll (op cit:53). Hence the role of 'the 
planner' is seen in terms of taking lithe lead in determining the needs 
and requirements of the community and the way in which they are 
satisfied ll (loc cit). 
1-.-
Perspective Two: Conflict and Increased Consciousness 
From the viewpoint of this perspective conflict is seen as 
endemic in society. Social problems are seen to be the result of a 
fault in the structure of society rather than in terms of individual 
problems. Inequality is a major concern: 
Thornley writes that "participation within the status quo is 
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seen as always being a participation between unequal partners" (op cit:46), 
and, further on, that the Ilessence of this perspective is therefore that 
equality is required in order to create a system of participation that 
is meaningful in both instrumental and developmental terms. For this 
to happen the power relations in society must be changed. These are 
radical, structural demands. What means can be used to achieve them 
and what rol~ canpartici~ation in planning play?" (loc cit). 
The major role of participation within this perspective is 
seen as raising consciousness and thus creating radical change in the 
structure of society. This consciousness can be seen to develop through 
a number of stages: firstly, the individual realises that his problem 
is not unique but held by many other people. Secondly, he realises that 
the solution to these common problems is against the interests of other 
groups in society. The third stage involves realisation that such class 
opposition pervades all aspects of the individual IS social situation. 
The final stage involves the conceiving of an alternative social structure 
through a struggle against the opposition. Participation would be seen 
as attempting to involve all sections of the community in this process 
of increasing consciousness, not only those belonging to the well-
educated upper and middle classes who have been shown to be the most 
likely to participate. One of the prerequisites for this involvement 
by all sections of the community would be that the ideas and reports 
of planners and politicians would be 'translated ' into a language that 
could be understood by all. 
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As in Perspective One, further implications for the role of 
the planner extend from the implications for power relations. Through 
participation's role in consciousness-raising, the public would gain 
increasing understanding of planning issues and thereby acquire power, 
based on expertise, from a small group of professionals. The 
professional planner's executive role would be taken over by mandated 
delegates who would determine needs and control the action of planners. 
Perspective Three: Containment and Bargaining 
Within this persepctive, the existence of conflict in society 
is recognised .. Conflict is seen as constructive and healthy provided 
that it is openly recognised, accepted as legitimate by all parties and 
is managed. As regards the acceptance, by all parties, of the conflict 
as legitimate, Thornley notes that the necessary preconditions for 
'constructive conflict' will be absent if criticism is regarded as 
troublesome and irresponsible by one of the parties (op cit:48). The 
aim which underlies this perspective can be seen as "peaceful, gradual 
change" (loccit) within existing legislation and policy. 
The role of participation in planning within this perspective 
can be seen in Dahrendorf's emphasis on the need to develop ways by 
which conflicts can be managed through processes of conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration. Thornl ey writes: "He (Dahrendorf) woul d see 
as necessary the setting up of formal means by which objections to 
planning proposals could be dealt with ... (such as) ... public 
inquiries (which) would be seen as a form of institutionalised arbitra-
tion" (loc cit). Within this perspective the role of public participation 
in providing the means by which new interest groups would develop, 
especially from under-represented and under-privileged areas of the 
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-community, would be stressed. It would be important that all interests 
would be involved: from the viewpoint of this perspective more violent 
conflict is often seen to be the result of a lack of balance within 
the democratic system, this lack of balance caused by the under-represen-
tation of certain groups "in the peaceful conflict of parties in a 
pluralist system" (op cit:47). The involvement of these groups would 
be seen as preventing this violent conflict. 
This perspective would view the role of the" planner in terms of 
facilitating and ensuring the process of mediation, resolving conflicts 
and reaching compromises. Thornley notes that although the concept of 
'the public interest ' would be in evidence within this perspective, in 
contrast to Perspective One, the planner "would explore the competing 
views expressed in the bargaining process in order to formulate this 
public inte.rest rather than taking a leading role" (op cit:53), and 
further that attempts would be made "to ensure that sufficient participa-
tion occurs ... to allow .. (him) .. to carry out .. (his) .. mediating 
function equitably and efficiently" (loc cit). 
2.4 LYTTELTON REVISITED 
In this section it is intended to relate the events and 
discussion of the case-study as presented in Chapter One to the perspec-
tives of Thornley's framework. A portrayal only, as opposed to a 
comprehensive consideration of the relation, is intended. In looking 
at the development of planning participation in Britain, Thornley has 
noted that although planning does attempt to combine different perspectives 
on social order "it is probable that certain perspectives will dominate 
at particular points in time" (Thornley, 1977:31). I suggest here that 
the assumptions and viewpoint implicit in Perspective One (Consensus 
and Stability) were dominant in the planning arrangements pertaining to 
the case-study. 
As noted earlier, Perspective One (based on the writings of 
Almond and Verba and the theorists of 'modern democracy') places great 
emphasis on allowin{LarL~lil~ttg!Tl~k~_Qg<;;t~t9ns. This characteristic 
is very much in evidence in the Lyt't~1ton events: at the stage of 
- ~- ...... ~~-~.-
goal formulatiol1 it was Doted that the gg_alswere internallygen~rated 
-- -~-- ,~--. ,. ,--- - ,- -- - --, 
by the Government and not subject to anyone's knowledge before they 
-------- --.~--~-------- - --~ '-- -. -,---. - -
were transmitted as "policy" to the Commerce Commission. It was noted 
-- -. ''"~''----'-----''''''-''- -'- --~ ... ---~-
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that the public took no part in the decision-making process surrounding 
-- - ~-- -----------
the various sta9.~~ oftheJ;ievel()Pl!1ent of plans. It was Ol1ly after the 
plans were submitted for approval that Liquigas began its "communication" 
I, " 
f'~ .'-0,,' ••• ' - -', 
ii~{:;C:~;:: 
1,-,""-," . 
with the publ ic. \ .-', ' ,',-" -
\ ,;C '<:' :;':-'. \ , 
This emphasis on allowing an elite to make decisions is perhaps \ ( 
..t) Clt)~ 
most vividly seen in_ look.ing at the power bestowed upon the Minister by' (tq~/ 
the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980. We saw that under s.55 of the I_I) , 1\ 1'\ I \,tl 
','Ij 1\ 
duly-amended mother Act, the Minister alone decides on the granting or i{ ?Cpe, 
\ 
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refusal of any application and that his decision is final. Other ~ r' ~ ! r(',C~ 
.. \ provisions of the Act which give the Minist~r further power over declSlon-
making were noted (see pages 30-31). In looking at the import of s.55 
in consideration of public participation it was concluded that all 
previously considered forms of public participation (other than those 
that had earlier been labelled as public participation as national 
governmental representation) were prescribed a role which was noninclusive 
of decision-making. 
Relating to this emphasis on elitist decision-making in relation 
to Perspective One, Thornley has pointed to the perceived usefulness of 
participation in improving the quality of information on which these 
decisions are based. As noted earlier, from the consensus viewpoint 
this information is seen as a tool whereby the adaptability of the system 
is ensured. Thornley pointed to how lithe plan adapts to public attitudes 
but is not formed by them" (op cit:44) through a process of two-way 
t .~. ,- ~.-_ 
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information exchange. In the Lyttelton events there is not much evidence 
_. '--,-," ----._._-,- -'-_ .. , -'._- . -, -
to suggest that either the plans adapted to publ icattitudes or that 
_.,- .-_ .. ,. 
any two-way information exchange took place. Possibly one exception to 
this, although the insinuated influence must be considered. highly 
doubtful, relates to the decision to change the siting of the L.P.G. 
bulk storage facility from Lyttelton to Woolston after a telephone 
survey had shown that there was considerable feeling against the 
Lyttelton siting by the Lyttelton community. 
It would seem that the flow of information was mostly one-way; 
from Liquigas to the public. It was earlier noted that during the 
stages of initial planning there was a general lack of consultation and 
a paucity of information on the part of Liquigas. It was only after the 
plans were submitted for approval that Liquigas's communication to/with 
the public became considerable: the availability and wide circulation 
of well-organised, well-presented documents, the publication of two 
pamphlets, a display in Cathedral Square and the holding of meetings were 
noted. As the development of plans was completed at this stage, it is not 
possible that the role of information here was to improve the quality of 
the decisions made. 
From the viewpoints of Perspectives Two and Three, such informa-
tion might be seen as having a citizen developmental function, that is, 
providing a better education, understanding and personal development for 
those participating - more specifically; consciousness-raising in the 
case of Perspective Two, and, in the case of Perspective Three, providing 
under-represented and under-privileged people with the necessary 'tools' 
for entering the arena of organised bargaining. From the viewpoint of 
Perspective One, such consciousness-raising and attempts to involve the 
public are seen as undesirable. As noted earlier, mixed attitudes to 
participation are seen as desirable whereby the stability of the system 
depends on some people remaining apathetic or uninvolved in planning 
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issues. In the Lyttelton situation, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the role of infonnation was seen as.i;l means to raise consciousness (and 
hence overthrow 'the system') or to stimulate public involvement by a 
wide range of people. 
... -~--.----~---.' ,---
Rather the view that existed would seem to 
conform to Perspective One, wherein this information would be seen to be 
contributing towards developing within the community a similar interpre-
tation of decisions already made: participation through information-
giving on the part of-Liquiga~~Q~fqrms to a socialising role whereby 
people are integrated into a similar, and ultimately their (Liquigas's), 
'way of thinking'. 
It was noted earlier that methods of information exchange that 
are oriented towards individuals rather than those that might stimulate 
interest-group involvement would be preferred within this perspective. 
Liquigas's 'methods' can be seen in this light: pamphleteering, 
di~plays, literature-supply, not to mention failure to convene promised 
meetings in Lyttelton. 
The assumption of value-consensus, lying behind the goal of 
developing similar interpretations etc., as discussed above, is also 
seen in the notion of 'the public interest' as incorporated both 
implicitly and explicitly in the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980. As 
related in Chapter One, under this Act, the Minister is the unchallenge-
able arbiter of 'the public interest'. It was noted earlier in this 
chapter that, from the viewpoint of Perspective One, "iriformation received 
from participation exercises would be used to modify and adapt the 
composition of 'the public interest'" (loc cit), and that "the more 
information obtained, the greater the legitimacy given to the concept and 
plans justified on the basis of it" (loc cit). In the case of Lyttelton, 
although the notion of 'the public interest' was prevalent, again it 
seems that little, if any, information was actually "received ll on the 
part of the 'planners' in order to carry out these processes of modifica-
tion and adaption and thus give greater legitimacy to the plans. 
I 
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At a first glance the existenceJof the Commission of Inquiry 
may seem to conform to the suggestions of Dahrendorf as outlined in 
Perspective Three. As noted earlier, Dahrendorf advocated the setting 
up of a formal means by which objections to planning proposals could 
be dealt with, the goal being to resolve conflict through processes of 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration. These processes would work 
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only if all parties were to accept the conflict as legitimate and if 
interests were organised into groups. The involvement of under-represented 
and under-privileged groups would be important. 
It can be seen that for a number of reasons the Commission of 
Inquiry did not fulfil these goals or conditions and therefore did not 
conform to the.viewpoint of this perspective. Firstly, as noted in 
Chapter One, the publi~ had no right to any hearing: under the 
Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 a Commission of Inquiry can only be 
initiated by the Minister or at the proponent's request. The ~1inister 
in turn sets the terms of reference and appoints the Commissioners. 
The proceedings took place in a semi-legal, adversarial atmosphere. 
These above conditions would seem unlikely to provide a background in 
which conciliation, mediation and arbitration could take place, 
especially as by this stage the plans would have been formulated and 
the Minister has the power of final say anyway. 
The above-mentioned adversarial atmosphere, together with 
such factors as financial inequality and lack of 'expertise ' on the part 
of the Lyttelton public, could be seen as unconducive to involving the 
under-represented and under-privileged. The role of the Commission of 
Inquiry could be better seen in the light of Perspective One, wherein 
its goals might be perceived of as those of integration, fostering 
consensus through the ~rocess of socialization ... and this is generous. 
•.•. < .... ,. ".-,">. 
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3. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING ,-
WHAT IS APPROPRIATE? 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
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It is perhaps fitting to commence this section with the only 
definitive conclusion that I can come to concerning the goal of this study. 
This is based on the consideration that attitudes and opinions about the 
role of public participation in planning are value-dependent: there can 
be no such thing as an objectively 'right' role; there are various value-
laden positions by which one prescribes meaning to the component subjects 
and' hence by which one.views public participation in planning. Failure 
to be aware of and/or explicate ones value position does not alter this 
fact and one cannot escape its ramifications. A principal ramification 
is that, whatever ones opinion, it has a basis'for which one can claim no 
exclusive validity. 
In a very real sense then, any attempt to come to conclusions 
as to the question of what is an appropriate role for public participation 
in planning, is arrogant. (Although constituting something of a major 
irony, it is a firm implication of the argument developed in this chapter 
that public participation must itself be involved in deciding the role for 
public participation in planning.) In the sense that value positions are 
personally held it must be considered that I can only proceed with a good 
deal of presumption. I acknowledge this, but can only state in defence 
that if discussion of value-laden issues was precluded on such grounds, 
much, if not most, and perhaps all, that is important would never be 
discussed. It is to be recognised also that failure to pursue issues can 
only constitute conservative support for the status quo. 
There is a consideration that, arguably, serves to ameliorate 
the arrogant aspect of my pursuit. The consideration is that value positions 
are not only personally held. There are several aspects to such a 
consideration. Every person is a member of society. If there is any 
validity to the notion that the essence of 'society' has any moral 
dimension, then values are to that extent shared things. Similarly, if 
one accepts that such as the planning community can and should have some 
degree of moral or ethical cohesion, then my value position pertaining 
to such as the subject of this study should be of interest and concern 
to others as theirs should be to me. 
Another aspect of the consideration that val~e positions are 
not only personally held relates to the idea that social organisation 
and institutions themselves embody value positions. That such is true 
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of planning arrangements and procedures is apparent from this study so far. 
The basis by which conclusions are to be drawn concerning what 
( , 
is an appropriate role for public participation is predetermined. The 
orientation must be to the appropriateness of the indicated perspectives 
and their respective assumptions. 
In the last section of Chapter Two, I suggested that an implicit 
'consensus' perspective and assumptions were dominant in the planning 
arrangements pertaining to the events concerning the case-study, and I gave 
some indication of the manifestation of this. 
On a more general national level and pertaining to social 
planning and the methodology of development in New Zealand, recent 
consideration has suggested that principal components of a consensus 
viewpoint have, particularly in the last decade, underlain planning 
activity (Thorns, 1982; Hall and Shirley, 1982:146-149). 
Hall and Shirley, in the context of the application of a framework 
developed for the investigation of the methodology of community development 
as pr~ctised in New Zealand, a framework which is similar to that'developed 
by Thornley and adopted in this study, identify consensus assumptions as key 
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components of New Zealand's mainstream development methodology. Although 
they identify a range of programmes and organisations that implicitly are 
based on alternative perspectives or models of development, planners and 
the planning institution are notable for their absence in these movements. 
Hall and Shirley note the contradictory traditions that lie at 
the heart of New Zealand's social and political development - viz: 
communalism/colonisation, socialism/capitalism (Hall and Shirley, 1983:146; 
see also Cleveland, 1979:Chapter2). Development policy and planning 
decisions are seen as not having confronted the contradictions, but rather 
as being oriented to "a form of 'economic myopia' which correlates social 
well-being with increased economic growth" (Hall and Shirley, 1983:146). 
Meanwhile, a consensus perspective based on the perceived 'economic myopia' 
is seen to be oriented about pragmatic economic policies with State agencies 
"ensuring system-maintenance and integration" and "a small group of policy-
makers making decisions for an increasingly depoliticized citizenry" 
(loc cit). 
The development rhetoric stresses shared values as the corner-
stone of a functionalist (consens~s) approach. (For latest example see 
National Development Strategy, 1983:3.) Such is perceived as being 
explicated in legislation (the Town and Country Planning Acts, 1953, 1977 
and the National Development Act, 1979), the documents of quasi-state 
organisations, and the practice of statutory and voluntary agencies and 
personnel. For example, of the New Zealand Planning Council exhorting "all 
sections of the community to become 'social partners in the great social 
experiment of planning by participation'", Hall and Shirley state: lIif 
one goes beyond the rhetoric and explores the underlying assumption in 
the Council's bipartisan approach, then it reveals a fundamental commitment 
to market forces, system maintenance and the preservation of the status 
quo" (op cit:148). 
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The consideration of the appropriateness of the perspectives 
and their pertaining assumptions in this chapter is pursued, principally, 
on a more general and conceptual level, at least initially. This 
facilitates the pursuit of the goal by enabling direct consideration of 
theoretical and conceptual issues involved while promising conclusions 
of general applicability. 
What then are the subjects or dimensions by which appropriateness 
is to be decided, which establish the criteria by which to comment on what 
is app.ropriate? The answer must accommodate the range of subjects that 
have been identified as problematic. Hence, clearly the range of subjects 
must be broad. Although not necessarily to be equally emphasised, 
consideration must be given to the nature of both planning and society, 
to the nature of issues cQnfrontingplanning and resource management and 
generally to the role of planning and planners in society. 
Before proceeding with investigation of the appropriateness of 
the various perspectives, I must establish a limitation that exists 
concerning the possible scope of conclusions. The limitation has its 
origins in the content-analysis basis of the perspectives' makeup. It 
aligns rather than correlates the constituent elements of the perspectives. 
It is a portrait rather than a strictly logical construct. While this must 
be considered a negative aspect of Thornley's approach, the ~ontenged and 
demonstrated impossibility of being able to logically order all meanings, 
let alone all downstream characteristics, suggests that the approach is as 
much as can realistically be considered achievable. 
However, and this is what is of importance to us here, the 
constitution of the perspectives hinders the scope of conclusions able 
to be logically drawn. Firm conclusions can only be derived from the 
features that give unity to the perspectives, that is the models of social 
order and their respective assumptions, rather than in relation to all the 
characteristics that constitute the other elements of the perspectives. 
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To ~ttempt to draw firm conclusions on this wider basis would be to assume 
that the elements relating to the social order models correlate with, and 
thus have strictly logical interdependence with, the other elements that 
make up the perspectives. Although Thornley does not explicitly deny such 
an assumption (neither does he suggest it), I cannot see that this assumption 
can possibly be made, despite a certain intuitive feeling for the pertinence 
of the perspectives as entities. 
The initial approach in this chapter then, focusses upon the 
models of social order and particularly upon their respective core 
assumptions. The argument is pursued at a general and predominantly 
conceptual level. In the final section of this chapter, the implications 
of the central conclusion of the initial (following) section are considered 
both in relation to the social order 'cores' and the wider perspectives, 
this despite the above-iterated difficulties with the latter. In this 
latter section, brief evaluative consideration of the case-study arrange-
ments and procedures in terms of the appropriateness of the implicit 
prescribed role for public participation is incorporated. 
3.2 THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF VALUE-CONSENSUS 
The context for the consideration of the central assumptions of 
the social order perspectives, namely value-consensus/conflict, must involve 
a consideration of the nature of contemporary society and the characteristics 
of the interaction between society and planning that arise, given the task 
of planning. These matters constitute the subjects of the initial approach. 
Therein and thereafter in this section, the approach ;s oriented to the 
consideration of several issues that are seen as centrally pertinent to the 
elucidation of a role for public participation in planning and that give 
structure to the discussion. The very broad and complex nature of the 
subjects and issues involved, as outlined above, determine that the following 
discussion is somewhat cursory. 
l~~i~~~;~8& 
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I have already noted the fundamental contradictory foundations 
of at least New Zealand's social fabric. Hany authors have stressed the 
heterogeneity, division and diversity of goals and life-styles that 
increasingly characterise New Zealand and western society generally. 
For example, Shirley (1979:41) writes "all societies are characterised 
by conflict between different groups who do not necessarily share the 
same values and aspirations ... ". Similarly, Darner and Hague (1971:225) 
iterate "society ... (comprises) ... a multitude of social grou-ps having 
different, competing, and not infrequently conflicting sets of values". 
He continues; "this view of society is neither cynical nor pessimistic; 
it clearly has some empirical reference II . .. . 
Some authors offer elaborate accounts. For example, Emery gives 
a portrayal of the "turbulent social field" that she suggests has 
characterised western society for the last two decades (Emery (ed), 
1976:6-10). Many other authors have observed and/or are centrally concerned 
with this perceived characteristic nature of society. (See, for example, 
Simmie, 1974, for a more comprehensive account; also, Gans. 1973:10; 
Rya n, 1979: 28 . ) 
Despite the unsurprising and seemingly incontestable picture of 
society outlined by these observations, it is worth noting, and arguably 
significant in the context of the following discussion, that many planning 
documents discussing such as social goals, make light of the diversity and 
frequent incompatibility of societal values and goals. The report of the 
task force on economic and social planning (1976:particularly 31-36) is 
not untypical. It, arguably, reflects what I consider to be a pertinent 
preference, perhaps reflecting an operational need, for planners to stress 
such as common goals and unity of purpose. 
The central contention in this concluding chapter is that planners 
should generally not proceed in their activity on assumptive positions that 
do not recognise, or de-emphasise, the social diversity of goals; that is, 
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th~y should not proceed with assumptions of value-consensus. The 
contention rests not on the argued preeminence of the diversity in itself 
but on the pertinence of this diversity to the task of planning. 
Most, if not all, planning and resource management activity is 
centrally concerned with the allocation and management of (scarce) resources. 
Generally the allocation is oriented to, whether implicitly or explicitly, 
some notion af optimising the social benefit of the resource. 
Such orientation is often prescribed in planning statutes, 
albeit frequently ambiguously. For example, the Town and Country Planning 
Act (1977) prescribes that use and management of resources should proceed 
" ... in such a way as will most effectively promote and safeguard the 
health, safety, convenience, and the economic, cultural, social and 
general welfare of the people, and the amenities of every part of the 
region, district or area" (s.4 (1) Town and Country Planning Act, 1977). 
The 'correctness of the anthropocentric orientation of planning's task has 
been indicated by O'Connor, et al (1982:121,122). I call this orientation 
of planning's task the 'social prescription'. 
The fact that resources are scarce means that planning and 
resource management are essentially involved in trade-offs. Optimising 
the social benefit of resource allocation cannot mean satisfying all 
societal interests. In this sense planning can be considered 'political' -
that is, it involves choice between competing interests. 
But there is a deeper sense in which planning is 'political'. 
In the competition for resources are involved different ideas about what 
criteria should determine the allocation. These ideas are value-bound, 
inconsistent and often conflicting. Thus the task of planning, that is, 
allocation, is concerned with mediating not simply between competing 
interests, but competing and other interests that are likely to hold 
different value positions about the criteria by which the competition 
should be 'solved'. 
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To adopt other than a value-consensus assumption of the nature 
of society is to emphasise that the task of planning is at least related 
to a contest concerning the selection of criteria which will determine 
the allocation over others that will not. The converse of this is that 
an assumption of value-consensus will tend not to recognise such contest, 
but rather will tend to presume the existence of a 'formula' for a 
socially-optimising allocation or the possibility of the identification 
of such a 'formula' by apolitical means. Such a presumption is, clearly, 
wrong. 
On these grounds, I can at this stage come to a central 
conclusion: that assumptions of value-consensus and thus also the 
consensus model of social order are quite inappropriate generally for 
planning and resource management. It follows that a role for public 
participation in planning prescribed commensurate with this model is, 
simi1arly, inappropriate. Inasmuch as one accepts the pertinence of the 
non-social order elements of Perspective One, and, I must stress, only to 
'that extent, then Perspective One represents an inappropriate basis by 
which to define a role for public participation. 
To reiterate the argument: the social prescription incorporating 
the notion of optimising social benefit in the allocation and management 
of resources i~ the principal orientation of the task of planning. But 
that prescription rests on values and goals held by individuals and groups 
in society that will often be conflicting. He can say that the prescription 
has no internal consistency. The task of planning is concerned with 
mediating between the different criteria which reflect and represent the 
different societal goals and values that comprise th~ source of the 
social prescription. 
Planning is 'political' most fundamentally because there is 
no way to 'know' or come in contact with the meaning of the soci~l 
prescription in operational terms other than to be exposed to the societal 
goals and values that comprise or underlie the social prescription: 
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prjncipally perhaps because of its internal inconsistency, its meaning 
cannot be ascertained by any other than 'political' means. 
The argument as outlined relates to several issues that are 
recurrent in the planning literature. They have common ground in 
considerations of whether planning can and should be, or be regarded as, 
'political'. Although they cannot be adequately pursued here, a brief 
consideration of several authors' thoughts will serve to establish the 
relationship, my thoughts, and assist in indicating a role for public 
'participation in planning. Various viewpoints held in relation to these 
issues will be seen to conform with the bases of the perspectives. 
The issue of whether planning is a political or apolitical 
activity occurs in many discussion contexts and is central, implicitly, 
in others. The position that planning is apolitical is most commonly 
associated, along with criticism of this position, with the rational 
planning model. (See, for example, Hemmens, 1980:259-260.) This model 
dominates much planning theory. (See Faludi, 1973.), 
The model varies concerning its precise content but commonly 
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consists of a four to six stage process which is oriented to the positing, 
analysis and evaluation of alternatives, generally to serve externally-
generated goals and policy. It emphasises planning as means-oriented, 
although it is not necessarily so confined. However, certainly the 
wider aspects of societal ends-generation are externalised as are other 
aspects of politics that pertain to choice and the responsibility for 
this. Furthermore, related to the last point, and of considerable signifi-
cance, the model externalises implementation. 
Van Gunsteren presents an explication of the rational model 
which is the basis~ of a conceptualisation of "orthodox public planning", 
which he suggests "is presented as the only means by which we can realise 
our substantive and common goals" (van Gunsteren, 1976:5). The conceptual-
isation is one of several that embody what he entitles the rational-
central-rule approach, which he eventually concludes is unworkable as 
~>'':~-<.'-;'''''. 
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"it-s rationality is inappropriate because it is too far removed from 
ongoing forms of life and from politics in particular ll (op cit:150). 
Van Gunsteren notes that orthodox planning, although 
isolating planning and political rationality in theory, in practice does 
not. The planner, in that the goals that are presented to him are mostly 
multiple, conflicting and vague is involved in making 'political' decisions 
in that he will tend to focus on some goals at the expense of others. 
Further, van Gunsteren notes that, in order to ensure the "comprehensiveness ll , 
or perhaps rather we could say the fulfi1ment, of his plan, the planne~ will 
want to control its implementation and therefore important decisions will 
need to be incorporated into the plan. This desire to see the fulfilment 
of the rationale of his work is noted by Rein (1969:239) both for its 
rightness - IIplanning that disregards the question of implementation 
. languishes as an academic irrelevancy II _ and for the fundamental . 
dilemma it poses. 
Relating back to van Gunsteren and his conceptualisation, 
because of the need to ensure fulfilment of plans, orthodox planning needs 
to subordinate political rationality to planning rationality. In order to 
do this it requires a 'new politics' wherein the planners become the 
'rulers'. He quotes Schelsky: IIfinally all authors give the same answer 
to the question about the relation between ('rational ') planning and 
politics: in order to ensure the rational development of the future, the 
planners must be the rulers, or politics must at least become planning-
oriented, which is inconceivable without the planners' participation 
in the exercise of authorityll (Schelsky in op cit:l0). The basis of 
such thoughts can be seen as commensurate with the notion that planning 
can be suprapolitical, a notion that is considered later in this chapter. 
Van Gunsteren firstly notes that, with his involvement in 
politics, the planner loses his special status as a neutral and objective 
expert. He also loses his legitimation: lithe justification and practice 
of planning become indistinguishable from the justification and practice 
J 
of.ordinary policy-making, to which planning was supposed to be an 
antidote, correction, guide, or whatever" (loc cit). 
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Van Gunsteren then considers deeper problems concerning the 
relationship between politics and planning which further elucidate why 
planning rationality cannot supercede or circumvent political rationality: 
lithe attempt to make planning rationality take the place of political 
rationality does not make sense II (loc cit). This contention revolves 
on the impossibility of planning providing the "solutions for the 
inevitable problems of power and co-operation" (op cit:ll), solutions 
which it requires in order to fulfil its rationality, but which can only 
be solved by political means. 
Briefly, power configurations stand between the rational plans 
and their effective implementation, thus distorting the rationality of 
the plan inasmuch as there are inequalities of power. Also, van Gunsteren 
sees that "orthodox planners cannot rationally and comprehensively govern 
the polity because they are not sufficiently able to change existing power 
structures" (op cit:l0). Therefore planning has to live, with existing 
inequalities of power. Thus plans may well end up benefitting such as 
well~organised groups, rather than those who should have benefitted 
according to lithe rational insight of the planners" (loc cit). 
Planning, then, is impotent in the face of, and thereby 
accepts, existing inequalities of power. In politics "problems of power 
and authority are at least discussed and sometimes even are the subject 
of common decisions that are more than mere words or confirmation of the 
status guo ante" (loc cit). The notion of the subordination of political 
to planning rationality therefore involves the subjugation of the ability 
to discuss and perhaps correct problems of power and authority that "are 
inevitable themes of human living together II (loc cit). This suIJjugation 
antagonistic to planning rationality itself. 
79 
Similarly, van Gunsteren sees that orthodox planning also needs 
the co-operation and commitment of many people in order to be effective, 
but that these can only be developed by political means. This is 
essentially because, as I understand van Gunsteren1s argument, any particular 
Government is only part of the political system. Government doesn1t 
constitute the wholeness of politics and thus the notion that the concep-
tualised rational planning can attain access to the 110gic l of the political 
system is mistaken. The logic of the political system and thus the basis 
for co-operation lie at the level of social organisation, in "soc ia1 life 
itself" (op cit:ll). Yet planning, as conceived in at least the rational-
central-rule approach, does not have access to this. 
Van Gunsteren further rejects the possibility of "division of 
labour", that is, planning providing rational policy, and politics providing 
power and co-operation. His grounds are, firstly, that this relies on the 
notion that planning can be apolitical, whereas it cannot if a planner 
wants his plans to be effective. Secondly, and more importantly, he 
argues that it is impossible to treat questions of power and co-operation 
apart from questions about the content of policies, that is, that changes 
in co-operation and power relations logically imply changes of policy: 
"discussion about power and co-operation .:!2. discussion about the content 
of policy" (loc cit). Planning rationality cannot do without such 
discussion that represents the very workings of political rationality, 
yet it kills the possibility of it as it kills political rationality and. 
"cuts the ground away from under its own feet" (loc cit). 
Any conception of planning which envisages that it can be 
apolitical while at the same time aspiring to be effe~tive is erroneous. 
As van Gunsteren concludes - "Only in a society where human plurality -
and therefore power and co-operation - is no longer a problem can planning 
rationality take the place of political rationality" (op cit:12). 
As van Gunsteren hints, the notion that planning rationality 
can subordinate political rationality effectively, therefore implicitly 
presumes the kind of society that 1I~1arxism' contemplates wherein absence 
of classes and therefore of plurality and political conflict mean that 
there is no function for 'politics'. Here we have a social model (in 
the pure post-revolutionary Marxist state) which contains the social 
conditions for which assumptions of value-consensus could be considered 
appropriate for such as the derivation of an appropriate role for public 
participation in planning. Need more be said? 
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Aspects of the question of whether planning can be apolitical, 
as addressed by van Gunsteren, have also been addressed by Gans in an 
article in which he responds to a paper by Friedmann (Gans, 1973; also 
see Friedmann, 1973). Several concepts and notions that frequently occur 
in planning are discussed. 
Gans is questioning Friedmann's interpretation of the 'public 
interest', in particular the issue of whether his conception is either 
workable or desirable. Gans argues against Friedmann's conception of the 
public interest as a suprapo1itical norm, which IIcan do away with the 
political dissensus of a pluralist society ... 11 (Gans, 1973:10). He argues _ 
that all societal goal s are pol itica1 in that anyone g"oa1 is un1 ike1y to be 
commonly shared and is likely to benefit some over others. 
He points out that there are only three goals which can be seen 
as in the communal i"nterest, that is, which are not political goals -
namely, individuals' survival, democracy and equality. (I personally 
would argue even against the first, at least in such general terms, as 
presumably would anyone who thought that war was ever justified.) 
He concedes that his lIobservations about the difficulty of 
applying the communal public interest concept are relevant mainly to large 
pluralistic communities - and nations ... 11 (op cit:11), and that in smaller 
communities where there might be homogeneity and thus more likelihood of 
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political consensus, there is a case for a concept of the communal public 
interest. But how much planning, particularly development planning, 
has or should have, its total frame of reference at the level of a small 
community anyhow? 
The issue of whether the public interest is to be determined 
by 'majoritarian' or 'communal' criteria (Gans's terms which he equates 
with Friedmann's 'procedural' and 'substantive' criteria) is seen as 
being 'resolved' by the difficulty in identifying communal goals in a 
pluralistic society and thus the essentially 'political' nature of all 
societal goals. That is, because all societal goals are political, the 
public interest can and should only be worked out by procedural criteria 
or by political means. 
Here again we see that planning cannot be apolitical, that it 
needs 'politics'. Also the notion of supra-politicism is seen to rest on 
ideas of there being identifiable substantive criteria which can be the 
basis of planning and resource management decis'ion-making. 
Accepting broadly the argument of Gans, I reject such 
contentions. Substantive ideas are important as principles which orient 
a planner's approach but they cannot be principles for direct decision-
making - they are principles which the planner must argue with and for, 
but they, or contentions based on them, must be endorsed in 'struggle' 
in the political arena before they are legitimate. (And by 'the political 
arena' I mean that 'space' in which the whole social community are actors.) 
This is a necessary requirement of fulfilling the social prescription of 
the planning task. The notion of public participation takes on new 
importance with these conclusions. 
It is perhaps fitting to bring this section to a close by 
relating something of Gans's optimism in facing his conclusions about the 
inability to identify goals that are in the communal public interest. 
While he acknowledges that the 'suprapolitical measuring rod(s} against 
which to assess political goals would make life (and planning) easier" 
(op cit:12), he states, and I agree, that lithe fact that goals are 
political in nature and can be achieved only by political struggle does 
not mean chaos" - as Friedmannhas intimated - liThe ultimate outcome of 
a world in which all goals are political is not chaos but compromise" 
(loc cit). 
3.3 WHAT IS APPROPRIATE? TOWARDS POSITIVE ANSWERS 
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It has been argued above that the assumption of value-consensus 
and concepts and notions, as indicated above, that are founded on it, are 
inappropriate generally for planning, given its task and the nature of 
society. Thus it has also been argued that this core assumption constitutes ," 
an inappropriate basis for the elucidation of the role of public partici-
pation in planning. To the degree that one considers Perspective One a 
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cohesive entity, particularly between its central assumption and other key ! 
elements, it follows that Perspective One generally,should similarly be 
relegated as inappropriate. 
In this final section the emphasis is on the more positive 
aspect of considering the meaning of accepting as appropriate the core 
assumptive base of value-conflict and aspects of Perspectives Two and/or 
Three as a basis for the elucidation of a role for public participation 
in planning. As will be seen, attention focusses on Perspective Thr~e. 
A primary orientation is to consider the case-study situation in relation 
to the role for public participation commensurate with elements of 
Perspective Three. As I pursue this synthesizing of Perspective Three 
with the case-study situation an indication of the meaning of Perspective 
Three in terms of procedural and organisational principles will be seen 
to emerge. In effect, the consideration of the broad imperatives of 
Perspective Three are clarified when juxtaposed to the contextual 
situation of the case-study. In this section, discussion relates to some 
of the principal non-social order model features and ideas of the 
perspectives despite the fact that their make-up determines that a 
comprehensive and conclusive fulfilment of the goal cannot be hoped 
for, at least within the confines of this study. These limitations 
were expounded in Section 3.1. Numerous issues, ideally to be explored 
in relation to the broad range of planning functions and processes, need 
to be addressed and resolved before the goal could be considered 
fulfilled. 
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I do not intend to be preoccupied in this final section with the 
differences between, and relative appropriateness of, Perspectives Two 
and Three. It is unlikely that planners would ever accept Perspective 
Two in toto as a basis for their accommodation of the participation of the 
public, not least because it implies a fundamental downgrading of the 
importance of planners and a relinquishing of at least all policy and goal 
formulation functions. The role of the planner becomes that of a technical 
servant. However, the perspective contains several ideas that could be 
realistically accommodated in the identification of a role for public 
participation in planning. 
Given that the operationalization of the social prescription 
logically requires the active interest and involvement of all affected 
citizen groups, the Perspective Two emphasis on raising consciousness 
levels and organising interests is useful, although perhaps not in the 
context of its 'revolutionary' meaning. The reflections and elucidation 
of this meaning as expounded by those emphasising such as emancipation 
and conscientisation of citizens (see, for example, Habermas, 1971, 1973; 
Freire, 1972; Shirley, 1982: particularly 285-288), might however serve 
at least as idealistic orientation for the planner's approach. The stress 
on the educative development and 'activity' or politicization of the 
citizenry stands only to facilitate the planning task as considered. 
The general broadening of the conception of social change to incorporate 
its societal-structural relevance can only be healthy for planning and 
promises greater fulfilment of the 'social prescription'. The wide 
perspective on social change can, arguably, be linked to those who argue 
such as that policy review should be an integral part of the planning 
process (for example, O'Riordan and Sewell, 1981). Similarly, the view-
point of at least the potential for social stability to be rooted in 
oppression and non-authoritative power is useful to the planning task. 
Other aspects central to Perspective Two would appear to be in line with 
much planning thought: for example, the stress on equality. (See, for 
example, Friedmann, 1973:56; Blake et al, 1983:Chapter 4). 
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Perspective Three, while perhaps generally being more likely 
to be accepted by planners as a basis for their accommodation of the 
participation of the public, contains some similarity in emphasis despite 
the radically different purposes involved. These similarities include 
educative functions, the organisation of all interests and stimulation 
of the citizenry. Both also share, although to significantly different 
degrees, the ide~ of the devolution of reliance on elitist planning and 
decision-making functions. Within Perspective Three perhaps lies the 
best basis for the delineation of a role for public participation in 
planning. 
Dahrendorf's views on the desirability and imperative of 
accommodating conflict are reminiscent of Galtung's views. ~altung 
notes the tendency in our culture to treat conflict negatively, for it to 
be thought of as something to run away from or to be eliminated. However, 
having noted that conflict is on the increase and that we no longer have 
suitable mechanisms for coping with it, he advocates that it be treated 
in positive terms; as a constructive force. He writes: II ••• if you 
can't beat it, join it. If you cannot remove conflict, why not adjust 
your thinking about it? Why not try and see conflict as the salt of 
life, as the big energizer, the tickler, the tantalizer ... 11 (Galtung, 
1968:25). 
Similarly, Dahrendorf emphasised conflict as constructive and 
healthy, but considered it imperative that it be 'managed'. The 
Imanagement l of conflict and the challenge that this poses is a major 
:-.:--., 
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concern of Perspective Three. This necessity to 'manage' conflict can be 
related to an idea established earlier in this chapter concerning the 
role of planners: that planners should, principally in order to fulfil 
the social prescription that constitutes their task, recognise and ensure 
the accommodation of the conflict in societal values and goals. 
Let me now, in relation to the contextual circumstances of 
. 
the case-study, consider the meaning of the 'management' of confl ict and 
thus what the prescribed role for public participation in planning 
commensurate with Perspective Three might amount to. 
In section 2.3.3 an indication was given of the meaning of the 
'management' of conflict commensurate with Perspective Three. Much 
emphasis is placed upon the organisation for the accommodation of conflict. 
A principal feature of this organisation includes the provision of a 
structure that allows different interests to demonstrate their conflicting 
views. As people have views concerning all levels of decisionmaking, 
that this structure allows for the expression of conflicting views at all 
stages of the planning process (from policy formulation to implementation), 
is important~ Clearly the provision of this organisation is related to the 
issue of the provision of information to the citizenry - generally, 
advocacy of openness of planning and government is implied here, inclusive 
of early indication of intentions by proponents .. This organisation for 
the management of conflict would be built into permanent planning arrange-
ments and embodies rights for the citizenry. Mechanisms for the 
resolution of conflict - conciliation, arbitration and mediation - are 
central features of the organisation. 
As reflected in Chapter One and section 2.4, the planning 
arrangements and procedures pertaining to the case-study were fundamentally 
antagonistic to such notions of organisation for the accom~odation of 
confl ict. 
It was seen that goal formulation occurred largely 
without the knowledge, let alone the consultation of the public. 
Exacerbating this severe limitation on public parti~ipation was the 
fact that mechanisms of national governmental and parliamentary 
electoral representation were far from satisfactory. The effect of 
this contextual 'environment ' for goal formulation was that little 
knowledge, let alone debate, of a1.ternative strategies prevailed. 
It was pointed out, additionally, that the public were only informed 
of the goals and the details of downstream planning long after site-
specific planning had effectively been completed. 
In relation to the development of site-specific plans 
it was noted in Chapter One that prior to plans being submitted for 
approval, the public was not consulted by Liquigas. This was related 
to considered operational imperatives and the working rationality of 
Liq'uigas. 
Thus, as regards goal formulation and the development 
of site-specific plans, there was generally a lack of knowledge, 
debate and consultation. In terms of Perspective Three's imperative 
that the management of conflict should allow for the expression of 
conflicting views at all stages of the planning process, these 
shortcomings are serious. Perspective Three stresses the role of 
information in encouraging the formation of new interest groups and 
in providing the public with better means by which to become involved. 
Both the lack of and delay in supply of information in the above 
events served to hinder the public in becoming involved and thus 
served to stifle rather than allow expression and therefore resolution 
of conflict. Stifled conflict is not resolved conflict: to so stifle 
expression is to deprive the whole conception of the role of public 
participation in planning inherent in Perspective Three. Such 
deprivation was considerable at the stage of formulation of goals (and 
objectives) and site-specific plans. 
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The deprivation of knowledge and information concerning goals and 
plans was not the only source of frustration for fulfilment of a role for 
public participation commensurate with Perspective Three. The public and 
principal local authority involved had not only to contend with unnecessary 
'mystery' as outlined above, but also, as iterated in Chapter One, they had 
to contend with uncertainty as regards what consent procedures would apply. 
At least some of this uncertainty was unnecessary. One aspect of this 
uncertainty was that information concerning the evolution of the Petroleum 
Amendment Act (2) 1980 was, at least for the impacted community, not forth-
coming until an unnecessarily late stage. Also, not only was there no 
consultation about the evolution of the Bill, but it would seem that both 
Liquigas and the Government Executive were quite content to leave the 
Lytte1ton Borough Council, and the Lytte1ton community generally, believing 
that the Council would be performing a semi-judicial role in consent 
proceedings under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act (1977), 
even when they knew that they would not be performing such a role. 
The uncertainty that existed as regards what consent procedures 
would apply is unacceptable from the viewpoint of Perspective Three. The 
lack of consultation, again, served to hinder the public's involvement. 
But more serious than this was the potential for the contended mistrust 
and frustration that occurred as a result of this lack of consultation and 
uncertainty to dev~lop into more intense and possibly irresolvable or 
unmanageable conflict. in order to avoid this, Perspective Three, in its 
emphasis on the resolution and management of conflict, stresses the need for 
all interests to be involved, and, more importantly here, for parties to 
agree on and adhere to certain 'rules of the game' for the regulation of 
conflict. The uncertainty surrounding consent procedures that existed in 
the Lytte1ton events and the negative consequences resulting from it, would 
likely have been avoided given the formalisation of the 'rules of the game' 
within a structure which allows for the management of conflict. 
'Formalisation' might need to be interpreted to incorporate the 
idea of the Drovision of constitutional quarantees, particularly 
.. -' .. ~. " -.,~ . 
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given recent Government action. 
In Chapter One I iterated the effects of the Petroleum 
Amendment Act (2) 1980. The extreme level of Ministerial monopoly in 
decisionmaking was noted along with the absence of citizen rights that 
have been embodied in other planning legislation for decades. The 
fact that the community had to indulge in a protracted political fight 
for 'a hearing' and for the terms of this, was pointed out. It was 
also noted that the Act, basically in that it is only an approval 
procedure (this despite the fact that it is the only investigation 
necessary before a proponent can proceed with a development), allows 
only a limited review of plans and accommodates, at least as a matter 
of necessity, no consideration of even site-plan alternatives, let 
alone policy alternatives. That this orientation towards approval 
. , ~ 
stands to limit attention to the particular plans rather than to 
broader contextual issues was emphasised. 
Several features of the above-related effects of the 
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Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 can be seen as contrary to the 
appropriate accommodation of public participation implicit in 
Perspective Three. The Ministerial monopoly in decisionmaking is 
contrary to notions concerning decisionmaking expressed in Perspective 
Three. Given the earlier-related conclusion that national governmental 
representation rests on an inadequate authority basis and thus is 
unsatisfactory as a considered form of public participation in the 
circumstances of the Lyttelton events, the Minister's monopoly is to 
be regarded as even more serious. Perspective Three, although not 
against the idea of decisionmaking by an elite, stresses the need for 
this elite to be open and responsive to societal conflict and for 
decisions to be based on competing views expressed in a bargainin~ 
process. That all interests have equal access to this bargaining 
process is important. The need for a formalised structure to be 
devised for the accommodation of competing views is clearly not 
:~:.::~~:::~:~i:7:~+~. 
~~i~:~~~~~~~~~~ 
89 
provided by or commensurate with the Ministerial monopoly in decision-
making, particularly given its finality. 
That the community of Lyttelton had no right to, and had to 
fight for the terms of, 'a hearing' is also contrary to the intrinsic 
imperatives of Perspective Three. Again, the provision of a structure 
which embodies such rights is desirable. The focus upon approval 
procedures and the iterated negative effects that occurred as a result 
oJ this in the Lyttelton events would be avoided given a structure as 
implied in Perspective Three. It was noted in Chapter One that the 
focus on approval and thus on particular plans rather than possible 
alternatives, both regarding site-plans and policy, resulted in any 
criticism of plans taking on a negative orientation. Perspective 
Three emphasises the need for a positive role for, and view of, 
criticism, and the full 'structural' accommodation of this, as a 
necessary precondition for constructive conflict management. 
In Chapter One many features relating to the case-
study Commission of Inquiry were noted that are antagonistic to the 
conception of a role for public participation in planning commensurate 
with Perspective Three. Such facts as that the plans to all intents 
and purposes had been finalised, and that the Inquiry was simply an 
adjunct to an approval procedure and only had the power to make 
recommendations, contributed to a situation in which there was little 
room or purpose in constructive criticism. I have already noted 
Perspective Three's emphasis on the need for a positive role for, and 
view of criticism, together with its full 'structural' accommodation. 
The Inquiry was characterised as a fight rather than as dialogue and, 
as noted above, a fight to which the public did not even have a right 
to partake in. The Perspective Three advocacy of a structure for the 
embodiment of such rights has also been noted. 
Inequalities that existed at the Commission of Inquiry 
between the proponents, Liquigas, and the Lyttelton community were 
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pointed out. Advantages of finance, expertise, resources and influence 
were shown to accrue to Liquigas. Such inequalities are antagonistic 
to Perspective Three's emphasis on the need for all interest groups, 
inclusive of new interest groups from previously under-represented areas 
of the community, to take part, together with its emphasis on the 
equality of access to and equality within the bargaining arena. That 
the Minister has the right to choose the Commissioners for such hearings 
can be seen as further compounding this inequality. 
It was noted that the proceedings of the Inquiry took 
place on a semi-legal foundation and in a relatively formal adversarial 
atmosphere. Such a foundation and atmosphere, particularly in the 
potential they have for contributing to such as a lack of self-confidence, 
are antagonistic to the Perspective Three imperative of encouraging 
people to become involved and' to openly express criticism and views. 
That this atmosphere was not conducive to honest and constructive 
dialogue was also emphasised. 
It was perhaps the Commission of Inquiry that could have 
provided the necessary forum for the incorporation of the Perspective 
Three processes of conflict management - conGiliation, mediation and 
arbitration. The above-related features of the case-study Inquiry 
would suggest that considerable reform is required in such hearings 
before there is the likelihood of these processes successfully 
occurring within such a context~ 
In the concluding part of this section several studies 
and articles are indicated that have been concerned in varying contexts 
with issues pertinent to the concern of this study. They serve to 
further clarify the meaning and implications of accepting the 
procedural and organisational principles suggested in the above 
discussion. 
The last subject considered in this discussion concerned 
i', 
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~he Commission of Inquiry. The planning institution of the hearing 
is an increasingly used facility in planning and, in its various forms, 
is, as suggested above, an obvious organisational basis for accommodating 
the Perspective Three processes. 
Many authors have investigated or considered this 
institution both in general terms and in relation to particular 
functional contexts. Particularly recently, many have suggested 
reforms that, as I see it, are commensurate with Perspective Three 
prescriptions. 
Ebbin and Kasper (1974) have comprehensively studied the 
Atomic Energy Commission's hearing process in the United States. They 
have recommended a number of procedural guidelines for the hearing 
which are similar to and expand upon those outlined as appropriate 
above (op cit:272-~89). One o( Ebbin and Kasper's recommendations is 
similar to Dahrendorf's advocacy, of particularly the early resolution 
of conflict. This can be associated with those who recommend early 
hearings, in relation to such as development planning and as part of a 
multi-step public decisionmaking process, in which are discussed broad 
policy issues. (See, for example, Open Government Report, 1983:no.16: 
12-15;no.17:6-7.) 
A number of Ebbin and Kasper's recommendations reinforce 
the Perspective Three emphasis on equality, and in particular equality 
of access to and equality within the bargaining arena. They recommend 
that funding be provided to legitimate citizen groups so as to remove 
the financial and manpower inequality that frequently exists between 
these groups and proponents. They recommend that hearings should 
involve evening or weekend sessions to enable greater equality of access. 
That formal statements and written comments made at hearings be summarised 
in language able to be understood by non-scientists, non-engineers, and 
non-lawyers is seen as important in safeguarding equality. This 
emphasis on the safeguarding of equality is also to be seen in 
r~commendations calling for the provision of independent assessment 
of such as the impact of technology on the physical, social and human 
environment and for the impartiality of adjudicators presiding over 
hearings. 
Estrin (1979), in the context of a critique of Canadian 
planning experience with 'the hearing', has made several similar 
recommendations stressing particularly the necessity for funding. He 
warns that "in the absence of ... funding the public would in many 
cases be better off without the hearings" (op cit:87). He usefully 
iterates the criteria for funding established by Mr. Justice Berger 
in relation to the McKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (op cit:86-87). 
In consideration of questions concerning decisionmaking 
in relation to radioactive waste disposal, Abrams and Primack (1980) 
have presented a model of the decisionmaking process that prescribes 
a role for public participation that is commensurate with Perspective 
Three. Their model, which they entitle "Critical review and public 
assessment", stresses and accommodates such as the desirability of 
constructiveness and openness of scrutiny, and the importance of 
'political ' public debate. Of particular interest is its perspective 
on, and accommodation of, the vital role of experts in public criticism. 
To conclude, there are two works that I would like to 
mention, both of New Zealand origin, which further assist in explicating 
the meaning of accepting a role for public participation in resource 
management and planning consistent with the broad principles indicated 
as inherent in perspectives which acknowledge value-conflict. 
The first, in the context of a study concerning proposed 
tenure change in the pastoral high country, is useful particularly for 
its expounding of democratic process principles despite the fact that 
they are, ironically, identified on the basis of a consensus perspective 
(Blake et al, 1983:113-121). The principles, broadly commensurate with 
Perspective Three, are good operational guidelines that could readily be 
applied to exploration of the broad range of planning functions and 
processes. Such application, beyond the scope of this study, would 
serve to further clarify the meaning and implications of accepting the 
procedural and organisational principles suggested in the discussion in 
this section in relation to the Lyttelton case-study. 
The second work, which prescribes a role for public 
participation more commensurate with Perspective Two than with 
Perspective Three, is a "Code for Resource Development" produced by the 
Ecumenical Secretariat of Development (1982). The Code contains some 
clarification of principles in terms of broad guidelines for practice 
which align with a role for public participation that is considered 
appropriate in terms of this study. However, perhaps its greatest 
value lies in its clear reminder that a prescription for a role for 
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such as public participation rests on value-bases, a fact which planners and 
resource managers can only ignore to the risk of their professional 
performance and the resources they manage. 
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